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 Executive summary 
The Australian Internet Security Initiative (AISI) is administered by the Australian 
Communications and Media Authority (the ACMA) to assist AISI participants address 
the problem of computers that are ‘compromised’ by malware (or malicious software). 
Malware infections enable computers to be controlled remotely for illegal or harmful 
purposes without the computer users’ knowledge. While malware compromises may 
not be recognised by affected computer users, possible repercussions for internet 
users include the mass distribution of spam, hosting of phishing sites or identity theft.  
 
When this research was undertaken there were 123 AISI participants who received 
‘daily’ reports of compromises that were detected on internet protocol (IP) addresses 
on their networks. These reports help participants identify customers who may have a 
computer that is compromised by malware. Participants who receive these reports are 
encouraged to inform their customers about compromised computers and assist them 
to resolve the problem. AISI participants also receive weekly ‘repeated sightings’ 
reports that identify re-occurring compromises.  
 
The research was conducted to understand the views of AISI participants about the 
operation of the AISI and how it might be improved. Twenty-four participants were 
interviewed by telephone between December 2011 and February 2012 by ACMA staff. 
Interviewees represent a range of AISI participants in different Australian states and 
include small, medium- and large-sized internet service providers, and universities. 
Key findings 
The findings are indicative of the ways that AISI participants respond to the information 
they receive about compromised computers. The small sample size of 24 does not 
provide representative measures of AISI participants, internet service providers or 
universities. 
 
Various actions taken by AISI participants to address computer compromises  
> The majority of the AISI participants (or providers) interviewed reported acting on 
AISI reports about compromised computers (21 of the 24 participants 
interviewed). 
> AISI reports were generally regarded as accurate and useful by participants. 
> Almost two-thirds of the providers interviewed who used AISI reports rely solely 
on these reports for information about malware infections. 
> Almost all interviewed users of AISI reports had processes in place to address 
compromised computer problems with customers. 
> The basic approach adopted by AISI participants to inform and assist customers 
to resolve malware problems involved notifying customers of the compromise, 
and providing information about the problem and how it might be resolved. This 
was usually achieved via an initial email and some providers did this by phone. 
> About half of the AISI participants interviewed sent a standard email to notify 
customers about all of the compromises listed in the AISI reports. Some others 
cross-checked the information first or waited for multiple instances of a 
compromise to occur before contacting customers, and some acted only on the 
most persistent or significant malware problems due to other operational 
priorities. 
> Most providers interviewed adopted strategies that encourage customers to 
respond to compromised computer notifications: two of these strategies relied on 
customers making follow-up phone contact with providers (in response to email 
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notifications or after their service had been restricted in some way); and another 
strategy was for providers to make follow-up phone calls to customers (often on 
the basis of AISI reports showing that the compromise had not been resolved). 
> Some providers temporarily isolated their customers (in a walled-garden or 
captive portal) or cancelled services to prompt customers to make contact with 
providers and deal with compromises. 
> Some providers gradually escalated their actions to encourage customers to 
respond to advice and resolve compromised computer problems. 
> Varying degrees of assistance were provided to customers to help resolve 
computer compromises, and over half of the participants interviewed offered 
moderate to considerable assistance. This tended to involve additional advice 
and direct customer support as required. 
 
 
Use of AISI reports by participants 
> Almost two-thirds of the AISI participants interviewed who acted on AISI reports 
(13 out of 21 participants) relied primarily on these reports for information about 
compromises to customer’s computers. Some medium- and large-sized providers 
used the AISI reports to complement or confirm other information sources. 
> While a substantial majority of providers reported acting on AISI reports, three 
small-sized internet providers did not: two were developing their processes; and 
one was not aware it was receiving email reports due to organisational changes 
since it had registered with the AISI. 
> Use of AISI reports varied considerably, with roughly a third of providers using 
both the daily and repeated sightings reports, a third mainly or only using the daily 
report, and a third mainly or only using the repeated sightings report.1 
> Automated systems were widely used to process AISI reports, mainly by large- 
and medium-sized internet providers. Processing AISI reports (and information 
from other sources) usually involved providers sending a standard email to notify 
affected customers about a compromised computer problem.  
Barriers to resolving compromised computer problems 
> Allocating sufficient organisational resources by some large- and medium-sized 
internet providers was found to be the main barrier to more effectively dealing 
with computer compromises. Of those participants who acted on AISI reports, just 
under a third identified resourcing issues as limiting their capacity to make system 
improvements or provide better assistance to their customers to help them deal 
with these compromises.    
> About a third of AISI participants interviewed (eight of the 21 who acted on AISI 
reports) reported that it was not easy or straightforward for them to match the IP 
addresses in AISI reports with specific customers or computers. This was 
mentioned by four medium-sized providers, two large providers and two 
universities. Difficulties occur where individual customers utilise dynamic (or 
changing) IP addresses, and where a single IP address is associated with many 
users such as in corporate organisations and universities. These difficulties 
indicate that some provider systems were not readily capable of matching IP 
addresses with customers or computers, although other participants reported 
being able to do this without difficulty.  
Customer experiences from the perspective of AISI participants 
> Residential customers and small- to medium-sized businesses experienced most 
computer compromises, and had a greater need for assistance from internet 
                                                     
1 Providers who use only the repeated sightings reports and not the daily reports miss a large number of 
infections on their networks. This issue is discussed further in the main report. 
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providers. Large-sized business clients and universities had fewer compromises, 
perhaps as a result of having in-house IT support and computer systems that are 
better protected from malware and e-security threats. 
> Although not quantifiable from this research, providers reported that compromised 
computer problems were usually resolved successfully by affected customers. 
These observations are based on direct feedback from those customers and by 
checking subsequent AISI reports for continuing problems.  
> Many providers also reported that customers were generally unaware of 
compromises on their computers, but appreciated being informed. 
> Some customers were suspicious about notifications from providers believing 
them to be scams or hoaxes, and consequently ignoring email notifications. Some 
customers also expressed concern about how ISPs obtained information about 
their computer and the legitimacy of that practice.  
Suggested improvements to the AISI program 
> About three-quarters of the participants interviewed indicated being mostly happy 
with the current AISI email reports, and had integrated the reports into their 
systems.  
> About half identified improvements they would find useful. Improvements mainly 
referred to the provision of additional information that would:  
> assist with the identification of compromised computers 
> clarify the sources of information used in AISI reports and the methodologies
used by these sources to identify compromises 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
> identify the volume and history of activity associated with compromised IP
addresses 
> identify infected websites hosted on their own networks
> explain different types of compromises
> advise providers about the actions they can take, such as quarantining
internet services 
> provide intelligence about e-security risks
> educate end users about the significance of computer compromises, the
consequences of compromises and how customers can protect themselves. 
 
It is significant to note that much of the additional information identified above is 
already provided regularly to AISI participants through the AISI program, and some 
information is not currently available from AISI data sources. More comprehensive 
information about computer compromises, including multiple sightings against IP 
addresses over a 24-hour period, will be provided through a proposed AISI portal that 
is currently under development. However, issues associated with computer 
identification can also be addressed by providers through other strategies such as 
improved network monitoring and analytical tools. 
 
Some of the other suggested improvements, such as the general education of end 
users about cyber security and the identification of infected or compromised websites, 
are being addressed by other agencies. 
 
> Some AISI participants were receptive to the idea of an online self-serve portal 
that was proposed to them during the interviews. Generally, these participants 
were interested in a portal if it provided useful information about computer 
compromises that they would otherwise not have. 
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Conclusions and recommendations 
1. AISI reports are important sources of information about compromised customer 
computers for most AISI participants interviewed. Current reporting formats need 
to be maintained because they have been integrated into many providers’ 
automated systems. 
2. The main barrier to more effective use of AISI reports is the limited resources 
available to or allocated by some AISI participants to develop automated systems 
and improve customer assistance.  
Sharing the research findings with AISI participants 
3. A variety of approaches are used by AISI participants to address compromised 
computers with their customers. Understanding those actions might be especially 
useful to those participants who are not sure how to work with customers to 
resolve compromised computers within a voluntary scheme. 
4. Sharing the research findings in this report could also be of broad interest to AISI 
participants to learn how others are using AISI reports and responding to malware 
problems.  
User-friendly information for AISI participants 
5. While information is regularly provided to AISI participants about the operation of 
the AISI—including the sources of reported AISI data about compromises and the 
expected actions of AISI report recipients—a number of those interviewed 
appeared not to be familiar with its content. Repackaging the material in a more 
attractive and user-friendly manner might help participants more easily access 
and use that information.  
User-friendly information for small business and residential customers 
6. Internet customers who learn about computer compromises from their internet 
providers might also find it useful to access well-presented and user-friendly 
information about relevant aspects of the AISI program. Information could focus 
on dealing with customer uncertainty, frustration and suspicion about the 
legitimacy of ISP notifications, and aim to improve customer understanding about 
the consequences of compromises and how they can best protect their 
computers. 
AISI online portal for additional information 
7. Interviewees were asked how useful they would find a self-serve online portal for 
additional information. A portal could provide more comprehensive information 
about computer compromises than that provided in the existing AISI email reports 
which may assist in the identification of compromised computers. It will also allow 
providers to undertake searches (for example, on IP addresses) and to more 
readily tailor compromised computer data to their specific needs. This portal is 
currently under development by the ACMA. 
8. The portal could be a resource for AISI participants that links to other useful 
information sources. For example, the portal might link to information from CERT 
Australia2 about how to report cyber security incidents, and educational material 
on cyber security for internet users from the Australian Government’s website 
StaySmartOnline.  
9. In a similar way, the portal could link to the internet industry’s icode and its 
strategies to protect customers and networks from malware and e-security 
threats.  
                                                     
2 CERT Australia is Australia’s official national computer emergency response team (CERT). It is provides 
access to information to help protect Australians and Australian businesses against cyber based threats and 
vulnerabilities.    
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Enhanced engagement with AISI participants 
10. Subject to resource availability, it may be useful for the ACMA to more regularly 
engage with AISI participants and more actively encourage feedback about the 
program. Such engagement may promote wider sharing of experiences between 
providers and reinforce an open line of communication.  
Further research 
11. Further research may be useful to estimate of the size of the compromised 
computer problem for internet users in Australia. 
12. The ACMA is undertaking research to establish Australian’s understanding of 
malware threats, their use of protections against harmful software and reasons for 
not using or updating anti-malware software. This research is expected to be 
published in late 2012. 
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Introduction 
The Australian Internet Security Initiative (AISI) is administered by the Australian 
Communications and Media Authority (the ACMA) to assist internet and 
communications providers to address the problem of ‘compromised’ computers.  
 
The primary activity of the AISI is obtaining data and reporting information that AISI 
participants can use to identify customers on their networks with computers 
compromised by malware (or malicious software). Its aim is for participating AISI 
participants to contribute to the reduction of spam and other e-security compromises. 
Participants are expected to advise customers that they may have a compromised 
computer, and to provide them with information to help them address the problem. 
 
The research presented in this report examines how various AISI participants who 
receive those compromised computer reports act on that information to help protect 
the integrity of their customers’ computers and their own communications networks.   
 
The ACMA’s strategic intent in conducting this research is to understand participants’ 
perspectives on the operation of the AISI and how it might be improved. 
Background 
Participation in the AISI is voluntary, and open and free of charge to organisations that 
provide internet and associated communications services to a range of customers. 
The 123 participating AISI participants at the time of this research, which included 110 
internet service providers and 13 universities, were then estimated to cover more than 
90 per cent of Australian residential internet users. The AISI commenced operation six 
years ago, and more recently operates alongside the Internet Industry Association of 
Australia’s (IIA) ‘icode’. 
 
The IIA ‘icode’ commenced in December 2010. It is voluntary and, among other things, 
aims to promote a security culture amongst the internet industry by reducing the 
number of compromised computers in Australia. The icode helps provide a consistent 
approach for Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to inform, educate and protect their 
customers from cybersafety risks. It encourages Australian ISPs to participate in the 
AISI and take steps to act on AISI reports. The icode is currently being reviewed and 
can be found at: 
www.iia.net.au/userfiles/iiacybersecuritycode_implementation_dec2010.pdf  
 
Acting on AISI reports involves informing customers they may have a compromised 
computer and assisting them to resolve the problem. Whether action is taken and the 
degree to which action taken is at the discretion of individual providers. 
 
The Australian Government provides a website to assist internet users with 
cybersecurity and safety strategies at www.staysmartonline.gov.au. The ACMA 
provides a national cybersafety and cybersecurity education program—designed to 
meet the needs of children, young people, parents, teachers and library staff—with the 
associated website at www.cybersmart.gov.au. 
 
Diversity of AISI participants 
AISI participants represent a considerable range of internet and communications 
service providers. Most are ISPs, and along with other communications providers, 
offer a range of services that include website hosting, server hosting, cloud computing, 
online business networks, and subscription and on-demand television or video, as well 
as telephone, data, video and mobile communications. Their customers encompass 
residential, business, government, and university staff and student users. 
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Characteristics such as the type a
available to them have a powerful
providers and their capacity to ass
nd size of service providers and the resources 
 influence on how the AISI information is used by 
ist customers. 
 the benefits of participating in the AISI program 
and ‘repeated sightings’ compromised computer reports, including 
rmation and who to contact about the AISI. 
I 
Information provided to AISI participants 
The ACMA through the AISI program provides information and advice to AISI 
articipants, along with data reports that identify compromised customer computers. p
The ACMA is also developing an internet portal that will provide additional data and 
information to participants. 
 
Information provided about the AISI program 
An information sheet The ACMA’s Australian Internet Security Initiative—Information 
for ISPs is distributed regularly to AISI participants as an attachment to emails. It is 
pdated as required, and emails are sent to participants when the ACMA has u
important new information to share. 
 
The information sheet covers a range of advice about: 
>
> how the IIA’s icode relates to the AISI 
> the information that participants need to provide to the AISI 
> the AISI ‘daily’ 
how the reports might be used and examples of the data presented in the reports 
> the information that participants might provide to customers about their 
compromised computer 
> the top 50 different types of computer compromises reported by the AISI, with 
technical explanations 
> some of the methods used by the ACMA to detect compromised computers 
 where to find further info>
 
The ACMA welcomes requests for further information and feedback about the AIS
program. Attachment A provides the latest AISI information sheet. 
 
Additional links to information about the AISI program can be found at the following 
locations: 
> AISI information page: www.acma.gov.au/aisi  
 Presentation given at IIA icode forum, 14 June 2012: >
www.slideshare.net/acmaSlideShare 
> Presentation given at Asia Pacific Computer Emergency Response Team 
(APCERT) Annual Conference, March 2012: http://event.idsirtii.or.id/wp-
ralian-content/uploads/2011/10/The-Australian-Internet-Security-Initiative-Aust
bot-mitigation-Bruce-Matthews.pdf    
> Presentation for the ACMA’s International Training Program, 2011: 
www.acma.gov.au/webwr/_assets/main/lib100656/4.2australian_internet_security
_initiative%28bruce_matthews%29.pdf  
 
AISI reports 
As part of the AISI, the ACMA emails two reports to internet providers who have 
registered to take part of the initiative and where compromises have been found on
their networks: 
1. 
 
Daily reports identify the number of infections detected for each AISI participant, a 
list of infected IP addresses and the corresponding name of the infection. These
infections have generally been reported to the ACMA in the previous 2
 
4 hours 
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and are emailed to participants. Attachment B provides an example of the da
report. 
2. 
ily 
Repeated sightings reports identify infected IP addresses that have been reported 
ich have been sighted 
t to AISI participants on 
fection 
 C
ten days or more out of the previous 14 day period, and wh
once or more in the last three days. These reports are sen
a weekly basis. As with the daily reports, these reports detail the type of in
reported and information about the most recent time it was detected. They 
provide a strong indication of a persistent infection associated with certain IP 
addresses. Attachment  gives an example of the repeated sightings report. 
f compromised IP addresses than 
e 
heir 
where individual customers are allocated the use 
 because multiple cases are 
s in a 14 day period. 
re reported daily by the ACMA to individual 
f IP addresses that 
ately 19,000. 
 a broad range of data sources from the global cyber 
 
l sources are also amalgams of different data sources 
CMA 
 they are not 
y the AISI 
re not readily available to providers or ISPs. 
t identify all forms 
f compromises affecting Australian internet users, and the amount of current 
 asked in general terms 
e ct to the current AISI email 
rts. A portal could p nd be 
cal to 
prov
 
The a new version of the AISI software that 
example, the 
curre
malw al data will be made available through 
e portal. Currently only the most recent event relating to a particular malware type for 
 is reported by the AISI when there may be data available for hundreds 
Daily reports provide a more comprehensive list o
repeated sightings reports that present only a small subset of compromises. It is 
estimated that the repeated sightings reports list fewer than five per cent of the uniqu
compromises covered in the daily reports. Therefore, participants who only use the 
repeated sightings reports would miss a large number of malware infections on t
etworks. This is especially the case n
of different (or dynamic) IP addresses by providers and
only detected for a particular IP address over 10 or more day
 
The number of infected IP addresses that a
AISI participants range from zero to thousands. The total number o
are currently reported per day for all AISI participants is approxim
Significant factors that influence the number of cases reported for individual providers 
include their market share, customer profile, network structure and systems, and 
management practices.  
 
AISI reports are compiled from
security community. Data collected are currently an amalgam of around 12 different
sources, and some individua
(such as the Shadowserver feeds). The data collected are carefully checked by A
staff to promote accuracy, and large amounts of data are discarded where
considered reliable enough for reporting. Many of the data sources used b
a
 
While the AISI program is as comprehensive as it can be, it does no
o
compromises not reported through the AISI is unknown. 
 
Proposed online portal 
The AISI participants who participated in the research were
wh ther an online self-serve portal might be a useful adjun
repo rovide additional data about the compromises detected a
an alternative access point for AISI reports and other information. It is not practi
ide comprehensive additional data in the AISI reports. 
ACMA is currently developing a portal and 
will enable the capture and reporting of considerable additional data. For 
nt 19,000 reports per day are filtered from between one and two million daily 
are-related ‘events’. Much of this addition
th
an IP address
of events for a given IP address over a 24-hour period. 
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Natu
Com an be compromised through the surreptitious installation of malware 
l
harm
aggr
distr
(DDo
 
Malw rom 
a consumer’s perspective, the most effective approach to protecting against computer 
-
 what actions, if any, are taken by participants in response to the reports to notify 
mers 
etails of the research methodology and sampling are provided in Attachment D
re of the malware problem 
puters c
(ma icious software) that enables computers to be controlled remotely for illegal and 
ful purposes without the user’s knowledge. Compromised computers are often 
egated into large groups (known as botnets) that are used to assist the mass 
ibution of spam, the hosting of phishing sites and distributed denial of service 
S) attacks on websites.  
are threats can have implications for both service providers and customers. F
malware is to use anti-virus or anti-malware software, and ensure that it is kept up-to
date.  
 
The nature of the malware problem is constantly changing as new threats arise. In 
May 2011, Microsoft reported that malware may occur at the rate of one in every 14 
downloads from the internet.3  
 
In 2010–11, the Australian Bureau of Statistics found that 90 per cent of the 15.3 
million people aged 15 years and over who have access to a computer at home also 
indicated they had anti-virus and firewall software. 4 This indicates high use of such 
software at home but does not identify the extent to which the software is kept up-to-
date.  
 
The research 
Research was undertaken with AISI participants to assist the ACMA to refine the AISI 
program by better understanding the measures used by participants to assist their 
customers to resolve computer compromises and any additional information or 
assistance that participants consider would enhance the program.  
 
The findings may also be used to inform the review of the icode that is taking place 
during 2012. 
 
Research issues 
The views of a cross-section of AISI participants were sought to understand: 
> how the AISI reports are used by participants 
>
and assist their custo
> how useful the reported information is to participants and their customers (from 
the perspective of participants) 
> how the AISI program might be improved. 
 
D . 
                                                     
3 Wall Street Journal ‘Malware is posing increasing danger’, Technology, 23 May 2011. 
4 ABS, 8146.0 Household use of information technology, Australia, 2010–11. 
   
10   |   acma   
 
Research findings 
th 
ave 
se of AISI reports by internet providers 
 
and assist customers to resolve compromised 
 
nd both said they had plans to act on the information. One of them in particular 
orted information, developed a comprehensive approach to 
ises and was seeking management support to implement this 
 
he third small provider was not aware that the AISI reports were being emailed to the 
ion about compromised computers on its network. Knowledge about the 
ISI program had most likely been lost due to staffing changes since initial registration 
7. As a result of the interview email contact was re-established with 
considerably 
particular pattern. There were no associations 
y 
s were made according to judgements about 
that could be accommodated within 
the 
daily and repeated sightings AISI reports, those who mainly or only used the daily 
report, and those who mainly or only used the repeated sightings report.5 
 
Daily reports were considered to be timelier and allow providers to inform their 
customers of computer compromises on a daily basis. One medium-sized provider 
also expressed greater confidence in the comprehensiveness of the daily reports that 
capture more compromises than the repeated sightings reports. In this respect, daily 
                                                     
This chapter presents the results of 24 telephone interviews that were undertaken wi
a selection of AISI participants. The findings are indicative of the ways that internet 
providers respond to the information they receive about customer computers that h
been compromised by malware. 
 
Where relevant, observations about differences between the various types of internet 
providers are noted. As with the sample as a whole, these observations about sub-
groups should not be regarded as representative measures.  
 
U
The majority of AISI participants interviewed said they use and act on the information
provided in AISI reports about compromised computers. Twenty-one of the total 24 
ere using the reports to notify w
computer problems. 
 
Reasons for not using AISI reports 
The three providers who were not using the reports were small-sized companies. Two
of these small providers had been registered with the AISI program for one to two 
ears ay
had reviewed the rep
address the comprom
approach. Management’s main concern in this case was the development and 
resourcing costs involved that would divert resources away from their main focus on
sales.  
 
T
organisation and consequently was not taking any action. Nor was it receiving any 
other informat
A
with the AISI in 200
this provider.  
 
Use of AISI reports by internet providers varies 
Whether an internet provider uses both the daily and/or the repeated sightings AISI 
reports did not seem to follow a 
apparent between internet provider type or number of cases reported, and use of dail
or repeated sightings reports. Choice
which information best suited their purpose and 
perational priorities.  o
 
Overall, there was roughly a three-way split between the providers who used both 
5 As discussed in the introduction to this report, the repeated sightings reports provide less than five per cent 
ISI repeated of the compromises reported in the daily reports. Therefore, providers that only rely on A
sightings reports miss a substantial number of computer compromises.  
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reports were regarded by some providers as easie
match with dynamic IP addresses.  
 
r from a systems perspective to 
Reasons for using or mainly using repeated sightings information are its multiple 
he 
t least six providers specifically used the repeated sightings reports to check that 
lmost two-thirds of the AISI participants interviewed rely primarily on AISI 
 
g only 
T sources. 
wServer 
cts 
p unexplained activity on VoIP ports 
esides the evidence in this report showing that almost all interviewees use the 
e of 
 
  
                                                     
reporting of cases over a number of days. Providers said they could be more certain 
that a problem exists. Some providers used the repeated sightings reports to verify t
information before they notified customers of a malware problem.  
 
A
problems had been resolved by customers. Some others used the daily reports for 
checking purposes. 
 
A
reports 
Thirteen of the 21 internet providers interviewed who used the AISI reports indicated 
they rely solely on the compromised computer reports that are provided by the AISI. A
few of these also used information from AusCERT6 to complement the AISI reports. 
Two of the universities and one small-sized provider interviewed mentioned usin
he AISI and AusCERt
 
Medium- and large-sized providers were most likely to make use of other sources of 
information (in addition to the AISI and/or AusCERT reports) to identify and guard 
against malware and e-security attacks. Some of these providers were less reliant on 
the AISI reports but many also used them to complement or confirm other information 
sources. 
 
The other sources of information and protections used to guard against malware and 
e-security compromises that were identified include the following:7 
 Shado>
> Google Safe Browsing 
> Arbor Networks products 
> Honeypots  
> Intrusion detection systems 
> AOL produ
> Abuse Reporting Format (ARF) email feedback reports. 
 
Other practices included gathering information in-house, system reports and 
equipment solutions such as: 
> customer care and fault finding 
> data flow, traffic monitoring and usage reports 
 methods to pick u>
> use of protective/preventative firewall and modem technology. 
 
AISI reports are generally regarded as useful 
B
reports, many also elaborated on how useful the AISI reports are for them. Som
the comments made were ‘very useful’, ‘very valuable’, ‘rely heavily on them’, ‘works
well in the background’, ‘sufficient to do the job’, ‘important for customers’ and ‘helpful’.
 
6 AusCERT is the Australian Computer Emergency Response Team based at The University of Queensland. 
ements. 
It operates within a worldwide network of information security experts to provide computer incident 
prevention, response and mitigation strategies. 
7 Some information sources were not identified due to confidentiality agre
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Details given in the reports about infection types, related IP addresses and date and
time information were regarded as c
 
ritical to being able to identify affected customers 
nd help resolve the problems.  
d ‘scary’. 
ats 
s, 
ces of information about compromised computers by many, and 
e actions taken by providers to notify their customers about compromises (discussed 
e’s 
o deal with the malware threat and [we are] keen to be good corporate 
und on customer computers often correlated with 
ases that were listed in the AISI reports. Similarly one university found the reports to 
promise may or may not reflect the accuracy of AISI data because some 
ompromises require specialised assistance and tools to detect. The recent 
names were occasionally incorrect but ‘not a 
, however, that various names are used to identify 
ames for the prevalent Conficker worm are 
 and Kido. Different names are also used by different anti-malware 
s and malware. 
re used widely to process AISI reports, mainly by large 
roviders adopted either manual, partly automated or fully automated systems to 
f the 
nterviewed processed the reported information 
ed either manual or automated systems, while 
ly automated. However, exceptions were found to 
a
 
Some providers indicated they did not do much about compromises before they 
received the AISI reports, and one medium-sized provider described their surprise at 
the volume of infections listed for their networks as ‘a revelation’ an
 
Most providers recognised the ongoing and developing malware and e-security thre
to their networks. This is reflected in the broad use of AISI reports amongst provider
the use of other sour
th
later). One medium-sized provider encapsulated this by saying that ‘it is in everyon
interest t
citizens’.  
 
AISI reporting is regarded as accurate 
AISI reporting was generally regarded as accurate. One medium-sized provider 
observed that the compromises fo
c
be ‘very reliable’ as they almost always found an infection. 
 
Two other providers observed that some of the reported AISI compromises could not 
be found on customer computers, presumably by the customer. Failure to find a 
reported com
c
DNSChanger malware for instance could not be detected by many anti-malware 
products. 
 
eOn  provider also mentioned that virus 
big issue’. It is often the case
individual malware. For example, other n
Downadup, Downup
ftwso are products that are used to detect viruse
 
Automated systems a
and medium-sized internet providers 
P
process the information that is provided in the AISI reports. Generally, most o
small-sized internet providers i
manually. Medium-sized providers us
the larger providers seem to be most
this general pattern as described below. 
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Processing of AISI reports by internet providers 
Automatic and manual processing of the AISI daily and/or repeated sightings reports 
involved matching the reported computer compromises to individual customers (from 
IP addresses) so that customers could be notified. For providers that use dynamic or 
changing IP addresses, the reported time and date of each compromise was used to 
help identify individual customers. This was mentioned by many providers as a 
particularly time consuming task when undertaken manually. Some computer 
compromises could not be matched with customers. 
 
For compromises that could be matched with customers, a standard email was usually 
generated and sent to affected customers. Emails were the main method used to 
notify customers about computer compromises but some providers made a phone call. 
 
Almost all of the small internet providers pro
reason given for manual processing was th
cessed AISI reports manually. The main 
e small number of computer compromises 
ift from a manual to an 
utomated approach in the future in order to save time, but they were constrained by 
e 
 
e AISI information, particularly to match IP addresses with individual 
ustomers. Two of these large-sized providers also automated their customer 
 
 
th 
d computer 
ompromises.  
used a manual or mostly manual approach to 
ies 
s 
e the e-
ctions taken by providers to address compromises on 
customers’ computers 
One of the most notable findings from this research is the variety of approaches that 
are adopted by internet providers to address the problem of compromised computers. 
This variety is in terms of the in-house processes used by providers and the degree of 
assistance and support provided to customers.  
 
Almost all AISI participants take some form of action to address compromised 
computers 
Except for the three small-sized providers who were not acting on AISI reports and 
one provider that did not notify customers about compromises, all other providers took 
some form of action to assist their customers resolve computer compromises. 
 
that were listed for their services which did not warrant automation. 
 
Medium-sized internet providers adopted a mix of manual and automated processes. 
A few of these providers also expressed their intention to sh
a
limitations on resources needed to make this change. Manual identification of 
customers who use dynamic IP addresses was considered to be a particularly tim
consuming exercise that could be improved by automation.  
 
The three large internet providers used semi-automated or automated systems to
process th
c
notification system by generating standard emails, while one assessed the information
about compromises manually against other sources of information before making
phone calls to each of the affected customers. That provider had fewer customers wi
compromised computer reports than the other two large providers. Automated systems 
were generally used by providers with a large number of reporte
c
 
Two of the three interviewed universities 
process the AISI reports, and one used a completely automated system. Universit
can use a manual approach because of the small number of computer compromise
they receive in AISI reports. One reason for the small number of reports may b
security and malware protection measures they take to safeguard on-campus 
computer networks and systems which are also supported by a team of IT personnel.  
 
A
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F
1. notify the customers affected—usually via email
our steps explain the basic approach: 
 but some did this over the phone 
2. provide information about the problem and how to resolve the problem 
3. request that customers rectify the problem—usually by installing and/or updating 
anti-virus or anti-malware software, and if required by seeking professional 
technical support 
4. offer and provide further assistance to customers.  
 
Notifying customers about compromised computers 
Initial emails and phone calls made by providers to customers about compromised 
computer problems include some, most or all of the following information: 
> notification that the customer may have a compromised computer (may identify 
the AISI program and/or the ACMA as the notifier, and they may provide some 
information about them) 
> IP address, name/type of compromise, date and time of compromise 
> recommendation that the customer update or install anti-virus or anti-malware 
software, and run that software 
> some recommend specific anti-virus or anti-malware software, either their own or 
others that are available free or for a price 
> some refer customers to their own website or the icode website for further e-
security information 
> most recommend that the customer seek advice and assistance from an IT 
technician or local computer shop if they cannot resolve the problem themselves 
> some provide contact details for IT technicians in the customer’s local area 
> most report inviting the customer to call the provider if further information or 
assistance is required. 
 
 
While the steps taken by providers to help resolve compromised computer pr
with their custom
oblems 
ers were basically the same, the approaches varied considerably with 
gard to the degree of information and assistance provided, whether follow-up phone 
terviewed (who act on compromised computer reports) offered moderate to 
odated within the operational resources of 
lems. After notifying and informing 
ese clients about compromises there was an expectation that the client would fix the 
ls to apply patches and deal with e-security problems in-house. 
bout 
ompromises, recommended running antivirus software and suggested that customers 
seek professional IT assistance if needed. Primary responsibility for fixing 
re
calls are made to customers and whether any measures are taken to limit or cancel 
the services provided to some customers.  
 
Customers receive varying degrees of assistance from providers 
The level of assistance provided to customers varied from what can be loosely 
described as limited, to moderate or considerable. More than half of the providers 
in
considerable assistance, while less than half provided limited forms of assistance. 
Levels of assistance generally reflect the type of support that is required by particular 
customers and that can be accomm
individual providers.    
 
Some medium and most large business clients required little assistance from internet 
providers to resolve compromised computer prob
th
problem. Medium and large business clients tended to have greater capacity and 
technical skil
 
Some residential customers were also offered little assistance by providers beyond the 
information that was given in the initial email notifications. Emails gave details a
c
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compromises was placed on customers. For instance, one provider did not give 
- and medium-sized business clients who required assistance. 
ion, helpful tips and greater 
ctly to customers over the 
hone and involved taking customers through the necessary steps to resolve a 
uld take customers through 
, 
as 
roblem if 
 
n to take the computer to a professional IT technician or 
o 
alware problems. Central or delegated IT 
 the universities were sent an initial 
 to 
ll-
wn 
r personal computer equipment.  
 resolve a problem. This included 
n, and phone 
one 
by 
d to 
rs continued to provide email notifications to 
 
recommendations because of the risks involved, another had no helpdesk support, 
and another only provided further assistance if its recommended antivirus software 
had been purchased. 
 
Most providers gave moderate to considerable assistance and support to residential 
customers and to small
Moderate levels of assistance tended to involve informat
support for customers. Support was most often given dire
p
particular problem. Customer service or helpdesk staff wo
the process of installing or updating and running anti-virus software, give helpful tips
reinstitute a firewall if it had been disabled, isolate a modem port until the problem w
fixed, and in one case offer to send out an outsourced IT person to fix the p
necessary (for a fee). Many providers said they try to give as much assistance as 
possible over the phone. If phone assistance failed to solve the problem, the last step
was usually a recommendatio
specialist retail outlet. 
 
Each of the three universities interviewed provided staff and students with medium t
considerable assistance to resolve m
personnel were available on-site to personally assist staff and residential students to 
fix problems. Affected staff who worked in two of
email notification about a possible computer compromise and were then expected
request IT support from their faculty’s IT staff if they could not resolve the issue 
themselves.  
 
In many respects, universities operate in a similar way to the large business clients of 
internet providers. Like large businesses, universities have computers that are we
protected against malware and e-security threats and have easy access to their o
IT personnel. One university also provided a web link to free anti-virus software for 
staff and students to download onto thei
 
One of the large-sized internet providers interviewed stood out because of the high 
level of support it gave to customers to help them deal with computer compromises. 
This provider reported drawing on a range of information sources, including AISI 
reports, to identify compromised computers before making initial telephone contact 
with affected customers—mainly corporate customers and also residential customers. 
ollow-up continued by phone for as long as it took toF
obtaining remote access to client computers with customers’ permissio
calls that could stretch to a couple of hours each and sometimes a number of ph
calls to an individual client before a problem was fully resolved. The attention paid 
this provider to compromised computers and associated customer service appeare
be considerable. 
 
Most internet providers have a strategy to assist customers to fix compromised 
computers 
 few small- and medium-sized provideA
customers with information and a request to resolve the problem for as long as 
compromised computer problems kept arising in AISI or other reports. They continued
in this way without any apparent escalation of the issue. In addition, one medium-sized 
provider only followed-up affected customers if they had purchased its recommended 
antivirus software. This provider was also still considering how it could address 
ompromises that were experienced by its customers who did not have the c
recommended antivirus software. 
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Most of the interviewed providers adopted a follow-up strategy to assist customer
further and resolve the problem. Three different communication strategies were used
two of which relied on the customer to initiate further contact: 
1. customer initiates
s 
, 
 phone contact with the provider after receiving initial notification 
ny 
ne of the large-sized companies interviewed said it reached a relatively small 
nded 
rs applied the second strategy to encourage a more rapid response from 
ustomers by slowing, limiting or cancelling those customers’ internet services. These 
to 
 
eport, when a compromise appeared in the next three reports, or if a 
e-
 
email/s about a compromised computer  
2. customer initiates phone contact with the provider after their service has been 
restricted in some way by their provider 
3. initiated by the provider when they continue to receive compromised computer 
reports that indicate there has been no resolution to the problem.  
Customers initiate phone contact 
The first strategy relies on customers receiving and reading an initial email notification. 
Generally, it was apparent from many of the interviews that a small proportion of 
affected customers responded to providers after receiving an initial notification. Ma
providers assumed that the problem had been resolved where subsequent AISI 
reports were not received for these customers.  
 
O
proportion of affected customers by email and did not have the resources to contact 
every one of them by phone. Further contact was only made if customers respo
to the initial email notification, or if the problem was still appearing after several weeks, 
seemingly leaving many customers without any notification of a potential problem for 
several weeks. 
 
A few provide
c
providers restricted the services of affected customers by putting them into an ‘abuse 
state’, a walled-garden or captive portal. The strategy effectively pushed customers 
make contact with the service provider.  
 
Providers make follow-up phone contact 
A number of providers adopted the third strategy and, like many of the actions taken 
by providers, they applied different approaches. For instance, they applied various 
time periods to repeat or ongoing compromises before making further contact with 
customers (after initial email notification). This follow-up generally included making a 
phone call to the customer if compromises kept arising in AISI repeated sightings or 
daily reports.  
 
As previously mentioned, some providers checked subsequent reports to identify 
repeat compromises that had not been resolved. This also triggered providers to make
phone contact with customers. Different providers had different schedules that would 
trigger a follow-up phone call. Examples are when a compromise appeared once 
again in the next r
customer had been emailed three times over the next six weeks about a compromised 
computer, then phone contact was initiated. 
 
Some providers isolate or cancel customer services to force customer contact 
Two providers (a small-sized and large-sized provider) confined customer services 
with computer compromises to a captive portal or walled-garden. These ‘abuse states’ 
forced customers to make contact with the service provider to resolve the problem and 
regain access to their internet service. This approach was taken by the small-sized 
provider that had a small number of compromised computer cases, and by a larg
sized provider, especially during times when staff resources were stretched. 
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This strategy was applied either at the beginning of the process (that is, when the 
initial email notification was sent out) or as part of an escalation process if customers 
were not attending to an issue.  
 
Another small-sized provider said that it would cancel a service in order to force a 
customer’s attention to resolve the problem. 
 
Another large-sized provider was considering the strategy of using a walled garden or 
ad not been 
implemented because it was too costly. 
 
rovided to other customers.  
 were 
acted on. 
sed computer problems. Escalation 
llows the initial email or telephone notification to customers and depends on 
ed 
l 
 
m if not already resolved. Some providers also used 
trategies to slow down, limit or cancel a service that would either prompt a response 
e 
rstanding by some ISPs 
bout the environment they operate in. Providers are not required to meet any 
h 
t 
captive portal and said that it is too expensive to set up. That provider had also 
considered a physical mail-out strategy to all affected customers which h
 
Some providers permanently cancel some internet services 
Cancellation of services occurred rarely and was mentioned by three providers as
happening to a small number of their customers over a period of time. This course of 
action was used in circumstances where it was considered necessary to protect 
providers’ operations or the internet services being p
 
One medium-sized provider cancelled a service only after numerous phone calls
made to the customer in order to resolve the issue.  
 
One university interviewed had a policy to disable users of their wireless service who 
did not follow advice and fix a compromised computer problem; however, this policy 
had never been 
 
Some providers have escalation processes for problems that are not resolved 
by customers 
Almost a third of the providers interviewed referred to specific escalation processes, 
(and others also indicated some form of escalation) that were used to encourage their 
customers to respond to advice about compromi
fo
customers’ responses.  
 
The adoption of various approaches by different providers has already been describ
with regard to making follow-up phone calls and providing customers with additiona
information and more direct support. The final stage of escalation for most providers is
a recommendation that customers seek advice from an IT technician or computer 
retailer to solve the proble
s
from customers or remove unwanted customers on rare occasions.  
 
One of the internet providers interviewed said it would like further information about 
escalation procedures, and specifically how it might explain actions such as servic
quarantining to customers. Some other providers also expressed uncertainty about 
their obligations and responsibilities and the best way to act on computer 
compromises. These comments possibly reflect a lack of unde
a
particular obligations and the best approach will depend on what is appropriate in eac
provider’s particular circumstances. The ACMA suggests in its AISI information shee
(Attachment A) that ISPs reset their user password so that affected customers have to 
contact their provider to regain internet access. The icode also recommends possible 
actions. 
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Types of computer compromises that are addressed by
providers 
 
pproaches taken by providers also depended on the types of computer compromises 
 
of the reported data before notifying 
ustomers, and some others took action only against significant malware threats. 
d in 
ected customers about all reported daily 
nd/or repeated sighting compromises that were listed in AISI reports. Small- and 
ourse of action, 
ther providers assess the compromises before notifying customers 
tifying their customers. This took 
 variety of forms and included the following practices:  
rent sources 
y of other sources (a total of eight providers did this: four medium-
dicate the existence of a computer compromise, and then 
ware problems 
 
r. 
ated sightings reports that indicate persistent infections as a priority. Other 
romised computer problems experienced by clients were only acted on by this 
provider where a customer initiated contact to report issues such as slow internet 
speeds. 
 
A
involved. Some notified all of the affected customers that they could identify with IP
addresses, others undertook an assessment 
c
  
Half of the providers notify affected customers about all compromises liste
AISI reports 
About half of the interviewees notified aff
a
medium-sized internet providers were the most likely to take this c
although one of the large-sized providers also sent out emails to all affected 
customers. Universities also tended to address each of the compromised computer 
cases they received. 
 
O
The remaining half (approximately) assessed and interpreted the data received 
against other available information sources before no
a
> cross-checking the information provided in the two AISI reports 
> identifying multiple reports of compromised computers from within individual 
sources or across diffe
> using AISI reports to complement other information sources and/or help confirm 
the accurac
sized, two small-sized, and two large-sized providers)  
> identifying and prioritising the most significant or serious compromises that posed 
the greatest risk to customers and the provider’s network 
> responding to customer calls about slow internet speeds or other unusual 
incidents that may in
match these instances against the computer compromises that had been 
reported. 
 
Underlying these practices were considerations such as a desire to act cautiously and 
wait for additional information in order to be certain about a compromise before 
informing customers. 
 
ome providers act only on the most persistent or significant malS
Some providers decided to act only on the most persistent and significant computer 
compromises. These included multiple compromises that were listed across different
reports and particular infections that represented a risk to the provider’s service. 
Having its IP ranges blacklisted was a major threat identified by one service provide
That provider also undertook periodic reviews to identify customers with multiple 
(about 20) reports for particular action.  
 
In assessing the data received about compromised computers, another internet 
provider said it prioritised certain issues over others depending on the threat posed for 
the business. This provider commented that ‘actioning AISI reports is a nice thing to 
do’ but not a priority. At the same time, however, its staff were directed to deal with the 
ISI repeA
comp
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Another provider, one that chose not to notify customers about possible compromised
computers, posted the information from the AISI reports in-house and crosschecked 
those reports ag
 
ainst customers who called in about issues such as slow internet 
lly 
o main barriers experienced by providers that interfered with their 
onal 
he 
IP 
ers  
riven 
ressing the 
edium- or large-
sideration for many of 
often 
pproaches described above, such as encouraging customers to 
spond to provider advice, illustrate how providers try to fulfil customer service 
any providers have difficulties linking some computer compromises with 
 
m 
d experienced at least some difficulties 
entifying computer compromises where customers had been allocated dynamic IP 
 
hile many internet providers experienced difficulties matching customers to dynamic 
IP addresses, some other providers did not report the same difficulty. It is likely that 
speeds. Like some other providers, they were not overly concerned about a couple of 
compromised computer reports against a customer’s IP address. Action was genera
based on the severity and regularity of compromises.  
 
Barriers to resolving compromised computers 
There were tw
capacity to help customers resolve compromised computers. The first was operati
limitations on staff and budgets, and the second was not being able to easily identify 
specific customers or computers from the IP addresses listed in the AISI reports. T
second barrier is essentially an operational manifestation of the first, that is, resource 
limitations impacted on the capacity of some AISI participants to successfully match 
addresses with specific customer computers that were compromised. 
 
Lack of sufficient organisational resources is an issue for some provid
Adoption of various approaches to address computer compromises seem to be d
largely by practical and operational considerations about staff resources, time spent 
phoning customers, time spent matching data, costs to the business, judgements 
ouab t the seriousness of computer compromises, other priorities, and add
needs of different customers (that is, residential customers, small-, m
sized businesses and universities).  
 
Less than a third of providers interviewed reported that they experience difficulties 
fulfilling—to a high standard—the tasks associated with compromised computer 
problems. Operational issues were the main barriers for large- and medium-sized 
internet providers.  
 
Achieving efficiencies in operational areas was the primary con
the interviewed providers. Responsibilities to address compromised computers 
conflicted with providers’ main business objectives to sell their services. 
 
The strategies and a
re
responsibilities to address compromised computer problems in the most efficient way 
possible. 
 
M
customers or specific computers  
Individual providers use a mix of dynamic and static IP addresses which they allocate
to customers. Use of dynamic or changing IP addresses for individual customers 
means that customers with compromised computers may be harder to identify fro
AISI reports than those on fixed static addresses. 
 
More than a third of the providers interviewe
id
addresses. Automated processing of the AISI reports lessened this difficulty for a
number of providers, but others often found the manual process—of matching IP 
addresses and times when compromises occurred with particular customers—very 
time consuming. This was the case for some medium- and large-sized companies and 
universities that manually process the data. One university said they were unable to 
identify or link compromised computer listings with some students, particularly those 
using wireless devices.  
 
W
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these other providers overcame the challenges by using software to assist this 
correlation, often achieved through an automated process.  
 
An associated problem was experienced by business clients and universities who use 
one IP address for a number of computers. Additional work was created for some of 
these providers and clients when they tried to identify which computer was 
ompromised. Without the use of software that could make identification easier, time 
taken to locate 
ith business 
 an 
es 
 of 
 
roviders identified residential customers, small-sized business clients and some 
cting on e-security problems was not always straightforward for some of these 
 malware problem can take up to two days to sort out by an experienced 
chnician which is expensive and may not be affordable for some of these clients. 
 
oblem which was not fixed despite spending a 
ses compared with residential 
ustomers and smaller businesses. Fewer reports were attributed to the capacity of 
g 
 
 
ssessment was based on feedback received from a relatively 
mall proportion of affected customers who had contacted providers or had been 
c
consuming methods such as scanning individual computers were under
the infection. Some of the universities interviewed and some providers w
clients expressed a desire for extra information that would enable them to identify
individual computer that was compromised.  
 
Small-sized internet providers were least likely to report difficulties involved in 
matching IP addresses to customers.  
 
roviders’ perspectives on customer experiencP
Interviews with internet providers can only give limited insight into the experiences
consumers who are affected by malware and e-security compromises. However, some 
intelligence has been gleaned from the perspective of service providers about the 
diversity of their customers, and the issues that some customers experience.  
 
Residential customers and small- to medium-sized businesses experience most
computer compromises 
P
medium-sized businesses as most susceptible to e-security risks, and as a 
consequence having a greater need for assistance to help resolve compromised 
computer problems.  
 
A
customers. Key reasons for the problems experienced were the continuing use of old 
computers and old operating systems, and out-of-date (or no) antivirus software 
installed on computers.  
 
One medium-sized provider said that many customers run older operating systems 
and have anti-malware that was probably free for a time when they bought the 
computer, and since then has not been updated. In some of these cases, this provider 
said that a
te
The same provider said it hears occasional stories of customers who have used a
third-party technician to resolve the pr
considerable amount of money. 
 
Conversely, many providers observed that large-sized business clients received a 
small number of reports about computer compromi
c
large businesses to have in-house IT personnel and computer systems that are 
protected by anti-malware and other agency-wide e-security measures or practices.  
 
Customers seem generally unaware about compromises and appreciate bein
informed 
Internet providers interviewed did not formally seek or gather feedback from their 
customers. Many providers also said that customers generally responded in a positive
way, were generally happy, thankful and grateful about being informed and were keen
to fix the problem. This a
s
contacted by providers about a compromise.  
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Providers said that many customers they had contact with were surprised or sho
as they were unaware of a problem. On the other hand, som
cked, 
e customers had noticed 
eir computer or internet service had been operating slowly or had another 
ssistance 
hat to do. 
ized provider had some customers who did not 
ant to know about the problem. The same provider also said that infections are often 
ufficiently 
der 
ssisted clients who were using its recommended antivirus software but were 
ved the 
e 
ustomer suspicions were mentioned by each of the large-sized internet providers 
 to 
 
r 
 the initial enquiry and advised that the email could be 
ported as spam. The process became somewhat protracted leading to frustration 
the 
 
oncerned said they needed to carefully explain their use of legitimate techniques that 
 their internet traffic. This involved letting customers know that their 
n by 
th
problematic issue.  
 
According to providers, customers also typically found the information and a
provided to be useful and helpful in rectifying the problem. Some appreciated being 
able to do something about the associated problems they had been experiencing. One 
small-sized provider reported that their customers did not always understand the 
details but relied on anti-virus software to fix the problem. Another said that some 
customers were confused and did not know w
 
Some customers were less responsive to the news that they might have a 
compromised computer. One medium-s
w
the result of customers following a link to an infected website without being s
protected, and that most infections seem to occur out of ignorance. 
 
Another medium-sized provider said that most of its customers with compromised 
computers who do not have an antivirus or anti-malware application do not do 
anything to fix problems and are repeatedly reported in AISI reports. This provi
a
uncertain how they should respond to those other customers. 
 
There were a couple of cases mentioned by a large-sized internet provider where 
customers were not happy because running antivirus software had not resol
issues. That provider contacted the ACMA for additional information to assist thes
customers further. 
 
Some customers are suspicious about notifications from their providers  
Some customers were reportedly suspicious about receiving compromised computer 
notifications from their providers, thinking that it was a scam or a hoax.  
 
C
interviewed, and by at least one medium-sized provider. Some providers said they 
found it difficult to prove to customers who they are, and that customers tended
ignore emails if they believed they were a hoax. One provider said that the customers 
most vulnerable to computer problems were the hardest to communicate with. 
 
One incident came to light during the interviews where a customer tried to verify the
source of a compromised computer notification email and was unsuccessful. Custome
service care staff misunderstood
re
and confusion by this customer until they contacted the ACMA who helped resolve 
confusion.  
 
Another provider referred to some customers who wonder how the information about 
their computer has been obtained and whether it is a legitimate practice. The provider
c
do not compromise their personal service, and were not illegally ‘sniffing’ or 
intercepting
sources were legitimate, that appropriate cross-checks of the data were undertake
the provider, and that the information they had about a compromise was genuine. 
 
One of the small-sized internet providers reported having an authorisation process in 
place so that customers feel confident in dealing with them about these problems. 
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Compromised computer problems seem to be resolved successfully by many 
affected customers 
Although not quantifiable from this research, it would appear that many comp
computer problems 
romised 
are being addressed and resolved by computer users once they 
re notified and advised about a problem by providers. However, some are not being 
le 
 to notify their affected 
ustomers about compromises. Many providers gave ongoing customer assistance 
tion of their 
ar to be facilitating 
e successful resolution of many computer compromises by affected customers—at 
k of any improvements 
 the AISI program or its compromised computer reports. Their views about a new 
 providers interviewed indicated being largely happy with 
e current AISI reports and email notifications. Generally, these providers reported 
a 
rs. 
 as 
dentify 
ustomers and generate standard emails. Changes to the current reports would 
il reports, about half of all the providers also identified improvements when 
sked. Suggested improvements were mainly about the provision of more detailed 
a
resolved quickly, and some are not being resolved at all where customers cannot be 
identified or where they are not being notified of minor compromises. It is also possib
that some affected customers might not be receiving email notifications from their 
internet providers.  
 
As reported, most of the providers interviewed took steps
c
over the phone, some prompted customer attention by restricting the opera
internet service, and some providers checked subsequent AISI reports to determine 
whether problems had been resolved. If reports stopped, providers assumed that the 
problem had been dealt with.  
By adopting a combination of these actions, different providers appe
th
least at a reasonable pace for the most persistent and serious events.  
 
Suggested improvements to the AISI program 
Each internet provider interviewed was asked if they could thin
to
online self-serve portal were also explored. 
 
Majority of providers are happy with the current AISI email reports 
About three-quarters of the
th
getting the information needed, that the current system works well and the reports 
were easy to use. Many of them did not suggest any particular improvements during 
interview.  
 
The extra work anticipated to implement any change to the AISI reports was clearly 
reason for not suggesting changes or improvements to the reports for some provide
Receipt of AISI reports often initiated some form of action by service providers such
causing a customer ticket to be created. Many providers had also integrated the AISI 
reports into their internal systems and automated processes that were used to i
c
interrupt their current processes, and for many it would demand extra work and 
resources that were not readily available. 
 
Many providers report that extra information would be useful 
While the majority of providers interviewed were largely happy with the content of the 
current ema
a
information and some comments were about the format of reports. 
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Some of the additional information identified below is already provided in the AISI 
information sheet (Attachment A) and the icode. This suggests that some providers 
are not familiar with the contents of those information sources.  
 
Also, some of the additional information mentioned by providers to more easily identify 
individual computers that are compromised may not be available. While some 
additional information can be provided by the AISI—such as multiple sightings of a 
given IP address that has been compromised over a 24-hour period—the identification 
of individual computers may be best addressed using software and other strategies by 
the affected internet service providers, universities and business clients—resources 
permitting. 
 
 
The extra information identified varied for different providers and covers: 
> details that would help AISI participants identify specific computers that were 
e time 
and resources that were needed by their business clients to identify affected 
, and how those sources are processed 
ch as 
ho do not resolve their compromised 
computer problem. This was suggested to assist providers when they 
actions  
some information 
as also considered helpful for clients or customers. Such information included: 
> greater education for end users about the significance of computer compromises, 
the consequences of compromises and how consumers can protect themselves. 
A few interviewees mentioned some other improvements relating to the format of 
reports and their timeliness. These were: 
> xml formatted information feeds to allow easier processing of reported data 
(apparently similar to the way that copyright information is presented)  
However, many of the providers interviewed regard the current tabulated reports 
as being sufficient for their purpose and for automation 
affected by compromises, particularly those in office and university situations 
where numerous computers use a single IP address. This was mentioned as a 
particular problem by a number of providers because of the considerabl
customers. Examples given were:  
> port information for compromised computers 
> source and destination URLs 
> whether a Mac or PC was used 
> the version of Windows operating system being used 
> what the compromised software requested from the user 
> details that would help AISI participants identify specific household customers 
whose computers are affected by compromises 
> greater transparency about the sources of information used to compile the AISI 
reports
> information about the volume of activity of compromised IP addresses  
> information about infected websites 
> better alignment of the reported compromises with the name given to the 
compromise (however, as mentioned earlier in this report, individual compromises 
or malware infections are often known by a variety of names) 
> information that informs providers what they can do or are allowed to do, su
the quarantining of some customers w
communicate with customers about reasons for taking certain 
> more information that could be referred to while reading the report such as 
hyperlinks that define and explain the compromises listed. 
While most additional information was for the purpose of providers, 
w
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>
compromises. 
 
Some providers are receptive to accessing an online self-se
 more timely reports that were not one to two days behind the occurrence of 
rve portal for 
dditional information 
a self-
er, 
al information about customer’s computer compromises 
 information about infected websites 
to promote 
 
the 
a
The AISI participants interviewed were asked if an online self-serve portal would be 
useful resource for additional information. Some said they were unlikely to use 
serve portal as they did not see any additional benefit or value to be gained. Howev
the idea of a portal was of interest to others if it gave access to useful information they 
would otherwise not have, and if it were presented in a way that could be easily 
automated. This information included: 
> historic
>
> intelligence or confidential information about e-security risks in order 
awareness and preparation in advance  
> capacity to be integrated into provider fault-finding systems so that customers 
could be informed about a possible compromise if they phoned in with a service
complaint 
> information in machine readable format and not requiring manual handling of 
data (where relevant). 
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Conclusions and 
recommendations 
1. For most of the AISI participants interviewed for this research, AISI reports were 
important sources of information that help identify compromised customer 
computers. They are particularly beneficial for participants who would not 
otherwise obtain and interpret such information. Current AISI report formats
to be maintained because they are
 need 
 integrated into many providers’ automated 
e of AISI reports was the limited resources 
e compromises within the resources they 
earch findings with AISI participants 
 
ally useful for participants who are not sure how to work 
with their customers within a voluntary scheme. The range of actions are 
summarised below. 
systems.  
2. The main barrier to more effective us
available to or allocated by some participants to develop automated systems and 
improve customer assistance. The research found a general willingness by AISI 
participants to assist customers to resolv
had available. 
Sharing the res
3. There were a variety of approaches used by AISI participants to assist customers
to resolve compromised computer problems. Having an understanding of those 
actions might be especi
 
Actions taken by AISI participants to address computer compromises  
> The majority of the AISI participants (or providers) interviewed reported acting on 
AISI reports about compromised computers (21 of the 24 participants 
interviewed). 
> AISI reports were generally regarded as accurate and useful by participants. 
> Almost two-thirds of the providers interviewed who used AISI reports rely solely 
on these reports for information about malware infections. 
> Almost all interviewed users of AISI reports had processes in place to address 
compromised computer problems with customers. 
> The basic approach adopted by AISI participants to inform and assist customers 
resolve malware problems involved notifying customers of the compromise, 
providing information about the problem and how it might be resolved. This was 
usually achieved via an initial email notification. 
> About half of the AISI participants interviewed sent a standard email to notify 
customers about all of the compromises listed in the AISI reports. Some others 
cross-checked the information first or waited for multiple instances of a 
compromise to occur before contacting customers, and some acted only on the 
most persistent or significant malware problems due to other operational 
priorities. 
> Most providers interviewed adopted strategies that encourage customers to 
respond to compromised computer notifications: two of these strategies relied on 
customers making follow-up phone contact with providers (in response to email 
notifications or after their service had been restricted in some way); and another 
strategy was for providers to make follow-up phone calls to customers (where 
subsequent reports indicated that the compromise had not been resolved). 
> Some providers temporarily isolated their customers (in a walled-garden or 
captive portal) or cancelled services to prompt customers to make contact with 
providers and deal with compromises. 
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> Some providers gradually escalated their actions to encourage customers to 
respond to advice and resolve compromised computer problems. 
> Varying degrees of assistance were provided to customers to help resolve 
computer compromises, and over half of the participants interviewed offered 
moderate to considerable assistance. This tended to involve additional advice 
and direct customer support as required. 
 
4. Sharing the research findings that are presented in this report could be of broad 
interest to AISI participants so they can learn how others are using the AISI 
reports and responding to malware problems. It might also help address 
managers’ concerns and uncertainties that prevent or delay some small-sized 
ISI information sheet (Attachment A
internet providers from acting on the AISI reports they receive. 
User-friendly information for AISI participants 
5. While information is regularly provided to AISI participants about the operation of 
the AISI in the A ), a number of those 
interviewed appeared not to be familiar with its content. Repackaging the material 
s through a set of Frequently 
 
are undertaken by the ACMA on data collected and the 
general accuracy of AISI reporting 
eir 
s 
l customers 
 other presentation of 
macy 
e source of notifications 
r 
mputers. When they receive an AISI report from their provider, they 
ith 
eds of 
le 
4-hour period—will be provided through 
an online self-serve portal that is currently under development by the ACMA. AISI 
in a more attractive and user-friendly manner such a
Asked Questions (FAQs) might help internet providers more easily access the 
information. The research findings indicate that such information could focus on: 
> how AISI report data are collected and processed to assist participants to 
better understand the range and coverage of the current AISI reports
> the checks that 
> differences between the daily and repeated sightings reports and th
purpose. While this information is covered in the current information 
provided, some AISI participants might not fully understand the parameters 
of each report 
> general information about malware, including the fact that different name
are given to individual malware infections. 
User-friendly information for small business and residentia
6. Internet customers, who learn about computer compromises from their ISPs, 
might also find it useful to have a series of FAQs or
information to which they could refer. The focus might be to help: 
> deal with customer uncertainty, frustration and suspicion about the legiti
of ISP notifications, how the information about compromised computers is 
gathered, and how customers can confirm th
> customers learn about the consequences of malware infections and how 
they can best protect their computers.  
AISI online portal for additional information 
7. Business clients often use a single IP address to enable internet access fo
multiple co
can sometimes have difficulty matching the reported compromises with specific 
computers on their network. Similar difficulties can also occur where providers 
utilise dynamic IP addresses for individual customers. These difficulties are 
experienced by businesses and providers who do not have the analytical or 
network monitoring software that can match the IP addresses in AISI reports w
specific computers or customers. Additional information focussing on the ne
these AISI participants would be useful where available.  
8. More comprehensive information about computer compromises—such as multip
sightings of a given IP address over a 2
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participants would be able to search the relevant databases for extra informat
that could help them identify the particular computers that have be
ion 
en 
rtal 
he portal could be a resource for AISI participants that also links to other 
information identified in the research as being of value to AISI participants and 
 
compromised. The portal will also allow providers to more readily tailor 
compromised computer reports to their specific needs. The availability of a po
for this purpose would not impact on the current reporting of compromised 
computers to participants. 
9. T
their customers. This includes information from CERT Australia8 about how to 
report cyber security incidents, the educational material on cyber security for
internet users that is provided on the Australian Government’s website 
www.staysmartonline.gov.au, and the educational information provided by the 
ACMA for children, parents, carers, teachers and library staff at 
www.cybersmart.gov.au.   
vided through the portal about the 
the 
Enh
 
 the 
 the 
t 
t 
 
12. Further research may be useful to better estimate the size of the compromised 
e to 
 of 
he 
 
se 
asons for not using or updating 
ected to be published in late 2012. 
10. In a similar way, information links could be pro
industry icode and its coverage of strategies that might be adopted to protect 
customers and networks from malware and e-security threats. In this way 
portal could assist AISI participants to conveniently access information about 
malware and related issues. 
anced engagement with AISI participants 
11. Subject to resource availability, it may be useful for the ACMA to more regularly
engage with AISI participants and more actively encourage feedback about
program. As with the ACMA’s current emails to participants, this might include
provision of news and information items and an invitation for comment on curren
AISI activities. Simply and attractively presented, such engagement might 
promote wider sharing of experiences between providers. Such engagemen
could promote the provision of extra information to AISI participants and reinforce 
an open line of communication. It could also be an opportunity to update provider
contacts. 
Further research 
computer problem that affects internet users in Australia. This cannot be 
determined from AISI data because many of the reported AISI cases can relat
one customer and many IP addresses can have thousands of customers 
connected. In addition, the AISI program does not identify all forms
compromises, and the amount of compromises not reported through the AISI is 
unknown.  
13. Given that Australians of all ages and other demographics are now using t
internet in many aspects of everyday life, the ACMA is undertaking research to
establish the Australian community’s understanding of malware threats, their u
of protections against harmful software, and re
anti-malware software. This research is exp
 
  
                                                     
8 CERT Australia is Australia’s official national computer emergency response team (CERT). It is provides 
access to information to help protect Australians and Australian businesses against cyber based threats and 
vulnerabilities. 
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Attachment A: AISI information 
for participants 
The ACMA’s Australian Internet Security Initiative—Information for ISPs 
 document is intended for Australian internet service providers (ISPs) currently 
cipating in the Australian Internet Security Initiative (AISI) and for Australian ISP
 may be considering joining the AISI. It provides some general information on: 
the objectives of the AISI 
the types of compromise reports identified through the AISI 
suggestions about interacting with custo
This
parti s 
who
> 
> 
> mers on individual AISI reports 
ed 
st of these users are connected to the internet via broadband services. 
he ACMA collects data from various sources about computers that 
 
ce of a 
ts the 
dvise them that their computer appears to be compromised, and to provide them with 
information to assist them in addressing the problem. ISPs currently participating in the 
AISI have informed the ACMA that when contacted, their customers are generally 
unaware their computer has been compromised and are grateful that their ISP has 
informed them of the problem. 
 
A trial of the AISI commenced in November 2005, and it has been running successfully 
since that time. 
 
> some of the methods used to detect activity in AISI reports. 
This document is regularly updated as new compromise types emerge and are add
to the AISI. 
 
General information on the AISI 
The ACMA developed the AISI to help address the problem of compromised 
computers (sometimes referred to as ‘zombies’, ‘bots’ or ‘drones’)—computers that 
have become compromised through the surreptitious installation of malicious software 
(malware) that enables them to be controlled remotely for illegal and harmful activities.  
 
While most anti-bot initiatives focus on combating ‘botnets’ (aggregations of 
compromised computers) by disabling their command and control or domain names, 
the AISI is focused on home and small business internet users whose computers are 
surreptitiously hijacked to send spam or steal personal information and login 
credentials. Mo
 
Through the AISI, t
are exhibiting ‘bot’ behaviour on the Australian internet. Using this data, the ACMA 
provides daily reports to ISPs and universities identifying IP addresses on their
networks that have typically been reported in the previous 24-hour period. The 
currency of the data is an important part of the initiative as it is based on eviden
recent infection that is highly likely to be still occurring when the ISP contac
customer. 
 
The reports are provided in a plain text format that is easily parseable, including 
information on the IP address, timestamp and type of compromise identified. The IP 
address and timestamp should enable ISPs to identify the customer associated with 
the compromise at a given point in time.  
 
hen an AISI report is received, ISPs are expected to contact their customers to W
a
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Why participate in the AISI? 
Participating in the AISI allows you to assist your customers by providing them with 
advice that their computer appears to be compromised, thereby giving them the 
opportunity to remedy the situation. It also contributes to the overall security of the 
Australian internet by disinfecting computers that damage this security. The problems 
associated with compromised computers and botnets are many and varied; including: 
> identity theft: the malware installed on the customer’s computer potentially may 
extract personal information, such as internet banking passwords and login 
information, for criminal usage 
> Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks on websites, which may render 
the website inoperable during the attack 
> dissemination of spam: over 90 per cent of spam is now sent from 
compromised computers 
> dissemination of malware, which is either embedded in the spam sent from 
botnets, or through directing spam email recipients to websites where malware is 
downloaded onto their computer 
> hosting of illegal content on a compromised computer, such as child 
pornography. 
Through participating in the AISI, you will contribute to the overall reduction of spam 
and e-security compromises, thereby reducing costs for all ISPs and internet users. 
AISI participants are listed on the ACMA website unless they request not to be listed. 
The current list of participants and some general information on the AISI is provided at 
www.acma.gov.au/aisi. 
 
The AISI and the IIA’s icode 
In June 2010, the Internet Industry Association of Australia (IIA) launched a voluntary 
ISP code of practice The ‘icode’, aimed to promote a security culture among the 
internet industry by reducing the number of compromised computers in Australia. It is 
designed to provide a consistent approach for Australian ISPs to help inform, educate 
and protect their customers in relation to cyber security risks.  
 
The icode encourages all Australian ISPs to participate in the AISI and to take steps to 
respond to AISI reports. It can be accessed at: 
www.iia.net.au/userfiles/iiacybersecuritycode_implementation_dec2010.pdf 
 
The icode commenced operating on 1 December 2010 and the associated website is 
at www.icode.net.au. The website provides information on the icode, a list of current 
participants, advice on avoiding infections and how to obtain professional help to 
address a compromise. 
 
What information do I need to provide to the ACMA if I decide to participate in 
the AISI? 
If you decide to participate in the AISI, the ACMA will require the following information: 
> your IP address ranges (preferably in CIDR format)  
> an email address to send the daily AISI email reports to (ideally the email to send 
reports to would be a generic address that does not need to change if there is a 
change in personnel responsible for managing the reports) 
> a direct contact number(s) and email address to discuss technical or operational 
matters concerning the AISI 
> your Autonomous System Number (ASN) (if applicable)—this helps the ACMA 
confirm that there are no errors in the IP range information provided 
> the name by which you want your company to be listed on the ACMA webpage 
and in the ACMA’s publicity about the AISI. 
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How many individual compromise reports will I receive daily? 
The number of compromises listed in the daily AISI reports will depend on your 
customer base and the quantity of the information feeding into the AISI on a given day. 
For example, ISPs with a large customer 
compromise reports per day, whereas ISP
base are currently receiving hundreds of 
s with a very small customer base may 
rarely get any reports. 
. Please contact us (details below) if you would like to 
?  
em: 
se (some examples of these consequences are provided in the section 
blems with compromised computers) 
fy the 
 
In the 2011–12 financial year, on average 16,517 reports per day were collectively 
provided to ISPs. 
 
In some or the daily AISI report for the particular cases it may be possible to tail
requirements of your IT system
discuss this matter. 
 
What information should I provide my customers about the compromise
It is recommended that you contact your customers and advise th
> that their computer appears to be compromised, with information on how such 
compromises can occur and the possible consequences of not addressing the 
compromi
above which discusses the pro
> that to protect others and to avoid network disturbance they need to recti
problem as soon as possible 
> of the steps they may take to fix their current problem 
 of the steps they may take to help secure their computer for the future (for >
example, firewall, anti-virus software, regular security patches). 
General information on how to prevent and respond to malware infections is provided 
at www.staysmartonline.gov.au/ 
 
ome ISPs immediately reset their customer’s internet access password when they S
are reported with an AISI compromise. The customer is then required to talk to a 
customer service operator to obtain advice on how to fix their problem. Depending on 
your particular circumstances you may wish to consider this approach, or potentially
consider it in the case of ‘repeat offenders’—that is, customers who have been 
identified with a compromise that appear to have either taken no remedial action or to 
have continued the practices that led to the compromise occurring (such as visiting 
‘suspect’ websites). 
 
n 
 
Section 6.3 of the icode also proposes a range of actions that ISPs can take whe
they become aware of a compromised computer on their network.  
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What do AISI reports look like? 
 reports are (in order, from left to right): 
rdinated Universal Time) 
the above example 
ISI report email for “DEMO ISP”: 
b character. Please note there is an additional field 
AISI reports are emailed to ISPs with AISI data formatted into columns. Attached to 
the email is a .txt file which is tab delimited for machine processing. 
 
An example of a daily AISI report for ‘DEMO ISP’ is below: 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
The subject line of AISI reports have the form: 
 
"[YYYY-MM-DD] - AISI report mailing for $ISPNAME - $NUM host(s) detected 
[SEC=IN-CONFIDENCE]" 
 
where: 
* YYYY-MM-DD is the date, e.g.: "2010-04-01" 
* $ISPNAME is the full name of your ISP, as supplied to us, and 
* $NUM is the number of compromises in the report. 
 
 The columns used in the
* IP address 
* Timestamp of sighting (in Coo
* Compromise type 
* Network (name of ISP) 
* Additional (further information on compromise type where available)  
 
Below is an example of the .txt file which would be attached to 
A
 
 
 
This .txt file contains one header row, followed by one or more data rows. All fields in 
this file are delimited by a single ta
(Port) in the .txt file that does not appear in the AISI email report. This column is 
currently unused. 
 
  
Dear MOISP Support, 
This report is generated by the Australian Communications and Media Au
Australian Internet Security Initiative (AISI) service. 
Below is today's list of open,
 DE
thority's 
 compromised and malware infected hosts on your 
networks.  For help interpreting this report, please contact 
<aisi@aisi.acma.gov.au>. 
 
All URLs contained within the report should be treated as hostile and capable of 
tp:// has been 
 Time (GMT+0) 
s ‐‐‐ 
 
IP  Additional  
10   None 
19  None 
10  None 
19 ‐03‐17 14:54:20  Trojan: Conficker     DEMOISP    None 
25 6 02:18:17  Trojan: Conficker     DEMOISP    None 
19  None 
19   None 
10   None 
10   None 
10   None 
 
infecting a user with malware without their knowledge.  As such ht
replaced wi h hxxp:// t  prev n  against accidental infection. 
 
 note, all timestamps are Please relative to Coordinated Univ rsal
 
‐‐‐ Report follow
v4 address     Times amp            Type                  Network   
.0.0.5         2010‐03‐16 17:11:31  Trojan: Conficker     DEMOISP  
2.168.7.0      2010‐03‐16 06:44:08  Tr jan: Conficker     DEMOISP   
.1.5.7         2010‐03‐16 05:37:22  Trojan: Conficker     DEMOISP   
.168.1.1      20102
5.255.255.255  2010‐03‐1
2.168.3.78     2010‐03‐16 01:54:24  Trojan: Conficker     DEMOISP   
2.168.1.100    2010‐03‐17 12:08:43  Trojan: Conficker     DEMOISP  
.10.10.10      2010‐03‐17 01:56:40  Trojan: Conficker     DEMOISP  
.55.66.1       2010‐03‐16 11:34:56  Trojan: Sality        DEMOISP  
.55.22.6       2010‐03‐17 12:12:14  Trojan: Sality        DEMOISP  
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Weekly ‘repeated sightings’ reports 
In addition to daily AISI reports, the ACMA also sends a weekly repeated sightin
report in order to assist you to identify high-priority/recurring compromises on your 
network. This report covers the previous 14 day period. 
 
In order to avoid reporti
gs 
ng compromises that have potentially already been resolved 
e repeated sightings report details compromises sighted for ten days or more out of 
ports are sent every week, so the period of one report overlaps the 
eriod of the next. 
peated sightings report mailing for $ISPNAME - $NUM host(s) 
etected [SEC=IN-CONFIDENCE]" 
e (in order, from left to right): 
t daily AISI reports) 
 
ore data rows. All fields in this file are delimited by a single tab 
haracter. 
e 
aily AISI reports. If you would prefer them sent to another address, or need any 
assistance interpreting this report, please drop us a line at aisi@acma.gov.au
th
the previous 14 day period, and which have been sighted once or more in the last 
three days. The re
p
 
The subject line of these reports has the form: 
"[YYYY-MM-DD] - re
d
 
where: 
* YYYY-MM-DD is the date, for example: ‘2009-09-01’ 
* $ISPNAME is the full name of your ISP, as supplied to us 
* $NUM is the number of compromises in the report 
 
The columns used in the reports ar
* IP address 
* Timestamp of earliest sighting (min timestamp) 
* Timestamp of most recent sighting (max timestamp) 
* Number of days on which the compromise has been reported 
* Compromise type (as per curren
 
Note that the ‘earliest sighting’ reported is within the scope of the previous 14 days. 
 
The compromises are listed in descending order of priority and days reported, that is, 
highest priority compromises and highest number of days reported appear toward the
top.  
 
As with the daily AISI reports, the attached .txt file will contain one header row, 
followed by one or m
c
 
By default, these reports will be mailed to the address which currently receives th
d
. 
 
Technical information on compromise types contained in the AISI reports 
Below are a number of commonly reported compromise types, however, new types 
may appear at any time depending on enhanced detection or new botnets arising.  
> MALWARE SERVING HOST: although rarely identified, these reports appear at 
the top of the daily list as they are considered to be in need of rapid action. As the 
name suggests, these IP addresses have been identified as hosting URLs that 
are serving malware. For these reports, the ‘Additional’ column contains the URL 
that has been identified as serving the malware. Often many URLs originating 
from the same IP address will be identified in the report. 
 
If you receive one of these reports, the ACMA recommends that you advise your 
customer that their page has been modified to include a malicious link or a ‘drive 
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by download’ frame. Compromised webpages often contain either obfuscated 
lain html IFRAME tag. 
ster Boot Record 
(MBR) and therefore is the first piece of software loaded and executed from the 
ereupon it hooks BIOS 
wn file system which is encrypted and stored 
d with the ‘Torpig’ or ‘Sinowal’ trojan. 
i is a ‘dropper’; it connects to one of a list of remote sites 
ownload a more specific malware component. 
des its files and registry keys from view as well as 
those of its components. It uses Internet Explorer (hiding the process from view of 
diagnostic tools) to download updates for itself over HTTP from one of several 
different hosts from a list which is periodically updated. The HTTP request used 
to retrieve the updates is a HTTP/1.0 GET request, with the location part 
consisting of a long hexadecimal string. Pushdo is believed to propagate via 
drive-by-download and via dropping by other malware. 
> Trojan: Rustock: Rustock is a spambot that uses a kernel-mode service 
executing in services.exe. It downloads encrypted spam templates via HTTP 
URLs with PHP files and random strings of numbers. It may also download 
random Wikipedia articles in order to include text from the articles to confuse anti-
spam detection engines. 
> Trojan: Delf.HPT: Delf.HPT is a dropper which connects to remote sites to 
download more malware. It drops a file called sxserv101.exe and attempts to 
issue a HTTP POST to http://74.208.64.191/hk1xx/getconf.php. 
> Trojan: Delf.FZ: Delf.FZ creates a number of .exe files on the infected system 
and connects to a number of remote URLs, some of which have a path 
ls. It 
avoid detection. It uses a HTTP C&C that typically has 
the filename part of ‘gate.php’. 
javascript or in rare cases, a p
> Rootkit: TDSS: TDSS is a rootkit that is used to hide other malware. It is a 
particular type of rootkit known as a ‘bootkit’, as it infects the Ma
hard disk by the BIOS, before the operating system, wh
disk I/O calls (INT 13h). It has its o
toward the end of the hard disk. It has kernel-level hooks that prevent the MBR 
and hidden file system from being read from within Windows. Depending on the 
variant, it may access a HTTP C&C independent of the C&C of the malware it is 
being used to hide. Kaspersky’s TDSSKiller is able to detect and remove some 
common variants. 
 Trojan: MEBRoot: MEBRoot is often couple>
MEBroot is a trojan best known for stealing online brokerage logins and hiding in 
the Master Boot Record of the host system. Due to the trojan being loaded on 
boot and advanced rootkit functionality we recommend scanning from a clean 
 stick). The more recent ‘TDSS’ rootkit environment (such as a rescue CD or USB
uses similar techniques, and as such, Kaspersky’s TDSSKiller is able to detect 
and remove at least some known variants of MEBroot. 
> Trojan: Clampi: Clamp
to d
> Trojan: Silon: Silon uses a ‘man in the browser’ type technique to inject code into 
banking website login forms and then transmit the captured credentials to URLs 
listed in a registry key that is unique per machine. Silon’s code is loaded into the 
iexplore.exe process from C:\Windows\System32\msjet51.dll. 
> Trojan: Spyeye: Spyeye shares many similarities with Zeus and is able to steal 
web form inputs, email, credit card details, as well as passwords used over 
HTTP, POP and FTP. It uses HTTP for C&C and (like Zeus) does so via a URL 
whose filename component often is ‘gate.php’. 
> Trojan: Cutwail(2),Trojan: Pushdo: Pushdo is a ‘dropper’ which uses a kernel-
mode rootkit to download various malware components including Cutwail, a 
spambot. The driver which is used to load the rootkit is specified in the registry, 
but the rootkit, once loaded, hi
component of ‘/surf/stat.php?uin=[string of numbers]’. It has an adware 
component and is also a malware dropper. 
> Trojan: Zeus: Zeus is a keylogger that is able to steal internet banking detai
uses a rootkit to attempt to 
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> Trojan: Gozi: Gozi targets bank accounts, and has features that allow it to, in 
g security measures such as two-factor 
 
l 
nts. 
r 
 peer-to-peer file transfer, and may open a backdoor. 
ng botnet which ‘phones home’ via 
ay 
> Trojan: Sality: Sality is a bot that uses a UDP-based (using random ports) peer-
eer protocol to distribute lists of HTTP URLs (which may, in turn host lists of 
Ls) to download other malware with more specific functionality. It can infect 
y-running processes. It is 
dows runs in safe mode. It 
ows firewall to permit traffic 
nect to its controllers 
us TCP ports such as 1430 and 8090. It starts via the Winlogon and Run 
eys. 
DoS capabilities. Earlier generations 
refix and sequential number, 
onkey) peer-to-peer 
ion may run as ‘asam.exe’ and 
k 
like ‘bounce’ messages, but contain an executable attachment. A backdoor is 
ng of Windows and antivirus updates. 
 Trojan: Grum: Grum spreads via spam (one known subject line is ‘Hot Pictures 
ndows 
m 
TP traffic is used to ‘phone home’ and inform the botherder of the 
machines (in)ability to send spam. A rootkit attempts to mask the infection. 
om 
l 
n startup 
some cases, defeat internet bankin
authentication and one-time passwords. It can use HTTP, or more commonly in
recent times, HTTPS for its C&C. Some known variants stop the Windows firewal
and security centre services. There are many  varia
> Trojan: Goldun: Goldun acts as a HTTP and SOCKS proxy and has a backdoo
for command and control. The proxy ports, uptime information, and whether or 
not it has detected PayPal, eBay or eGold accounts are sent to a web server via 
a GET request. 
> Trojan: Beagle/Bagel: Beagle is a worm with many variants. It may spread by 
mass email or
> Trojan: Xarvester: Xarvester is a spammi
HTTP. It uses a kernel-mode rootkit including its own TCP stack and as such m
be difficult to detect on the infected computer. 
to-p
UR
executable files on disk and inject code into alread
capable of running with full functionality even when Win
may add registry entries that configure the Wind
from/to infected executables. 
> Trojan: Lethic: Lethic is a spambot that may attempt to con
via vario
registry k
> Trojan: Stormworm: Storm has spam and D
of Storm usually have executables named with a p
such as ‘game0.exe’ ‘game5.exe’ and use the eD2k (aka eD
protocol for C&C. The most recent known generat
uses HTTP for C&C. 
> Trojan: Mydoom: Mydoom is a worm that spreads via email messages that loo
opened on TCP port 3127. Although this worm was originally released in 2004, it 
was resurrected in 2009 with a new variant which also aims to prevent the 
downloadi
>
of Britney Speers’) with links to ‘drive-by-download’ sites which exploit a Wi
vulnerability to infect WINLOGON.EXE with code to turn the machine into a spa
bot. HT
> Trojan: Festi: Festi is a bot using a kernel-mode rootkit. It ‘phones home’ for 
instructions and may modify Windows firewall settings to permit inbound 
connections. 
> Trojan: Waledac: Waledac is a spambot which harvests email addresses fr
your computer and uploads them to the botnet controller. When instructed, it wil
send spam containing a URL at which a copy of the worm is hosted with the aim 
of infecting the recipient of the message. The message subjects often refer to 
upcoming holidays (e.g., ‘Merry Christmas wishes just for you’), current world 
events (for example, ‘Breaking news about our president-elect’) or some 
unspecified news (‘Awful news’) to tempt the recipient to open it. Waledac has 
also been part of the payload of some variants of Conficker. 
> Trojan: Zapchast, Trojan: Reposin: Zapchast (sometimes identified by one of 
its aliases, Reposin) is a botnet that communicates using IRC. It is run o
via the ‘Run’ registry key. Up-to-date anti-virus software can remove known 
variants but new variants continue to be discovered. 
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> Trojan: Cimbot: Cimbot is a spambot which communicates with its controller 
using HTTP. The commands are encoded in what appear in protocol analysis to 
d 
 
 
r 82, and is installed to 
ith 
port.sys. The user mode program is typically installed at 
.exe. 
the actual 
 as Downadup. This identifies a 
y real chance of a false 
be GIF files. 
> Trojan: Iflar: Iflar connects to a HTTP server and downloads a new copy (if there 
is a newer one available) of itself along with data for constructing spam 
messages, which it then sends.   
> Trojan: Maazben: Maazben effectively turns the computer into an anonymous 
open relay. Some variants use the default mail client to send mail rather than 
using an SMTP engine of their own. It checks itself against several blacklists 
before sending spam. It may also contact various HTTP servers for updates and 
open a backdoor on a random TCP port. 
> Trojan: Gheg: Gheg is a spambot that uses HTTPS to communicate with its 
controller. It configures the Windows firewall to allow itself through and modifies 
the registry so that it runs on startup (via Winlogon and run keys). 
> Trojan: Netsky: Netsky is a worm that propagates via email, attaching itself to 
messages it sends to addresses found on the computer. The messages have 
various fraudulent inducements for the recipient to open the attachment, for 
example, that it is an important document, the recipient’s computer is infected an
must be cleaned with the attachment. 
> Trojan: Donbot: Donbot is a spambot that connects to its controller on random 
TCP ports above 2200. It can send spam not only via SMTP, but also Twitter. The 
executable is typically C:\Windows\System32\sysmgr.exe which is added to the 
run registry key so that the bot is executed on startup. Donbot has been known to
be dropped by worms exploiting Windows vulnerabilities. 
> Trojan: Darkmailer: Darkmailer, AKA YellSoft Direct Mailer, is a mass-mailing 
web application with features designed for spammers. It is often installed on 
compromised webservers and by default has the filename ‘dm.cgi’ although it is 
frequently renamed. 
> Trojan: Dlena: This family contains many variants; most of the known variants 
are stored in C:\Windows\System32\rpcc.dll which is loaded as a network service 
on startup via modifications to the registry, and enable use of the infected 
computer as a HTTP proxy server and a spambot. 
> Trojan: Bobax: Bobax modifies C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts to make 
various anti-virus update sites unreachable. It communicates with its controller 
using HTTP from which it is given instructions to send spam. It propagates via 
LSASS vulnerability in Windows. 
> Trojan: Asprox: Asprox permits the machine it is installed on to be used as a
proxy server. It typically listens for requests on port 80 o
C:\Windows\System32\aspimgr.exe. 
> Trojan: Fivetoone: Fivetoone, also known as DMSpammer, communicates w
its C&C server via HTTP, which sends it information for carrying out spam 
campaigns. It installs kernel mode drivers at C:\Windows\System32\hdfile.sys and 
C:\Windows\System32\hd
either C:\Windows\System32\qtplugin.exe or C:\Windows\System32\services
> Trojan: Avalanche: Avalanche is a spamming botnet and phishing reverse-
proxy.  It listens on port 80 for HTTP requests which it proxies to 
phishing web host. It is installed to C:\Windows\System32\sysservice.exe and 
loads C:\Windows\System32\sysservice.dll. It runs via the registry key 
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run. 
> Trojan: Conficker: Conficker is also known
machine seen connecting to a Conficker sinkhole. Anti-botnet organisations have 
purchased a number of domains used by Conficker for command and control, and 
have pointed these domains at ‘sinkhole’ servers. These servers then log the 
connecting IPs and report them to the ACMA. The onl
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positive in this case is if a user has attempted to access the botnets coordinatio
servers. This is unlikely as there are no actual ‘pages’ live on these servers;
talk in an XML variant via port 80. 
> Trojan: Ponmocup: Ponmocup modifies the Windows hosts file 
(C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts) in order to dire
n 
 they 
ct traffic intended for 
injecting itself into running processes, such as svchost.exe and 
ense key generator (‘keygen’) or 
s for many different applications, using HTTP for 
ail to it, which has then been submitted to the ACMA’s 
s 
rs 
ild 
 has 
 reported IP address in the last 24 hours. A trojan horse and a web 
clude 
particular websites elsewhere, or effectively disable them. It uses a HTTP C&C 
mechanism; known URLs contain very long hexadecimal strings. 
> Trojan: Ramnit: Ramnit is known to evade firewalls and other detection 
mechanisms by 
iexplore.exe. It may modify the registry to ensure that it starts on boot. It uses a 
custom protocol on TCP port 443 for C&C. 
> Trojan: Artro:  Artro, also known as CodecPack, can be distributed by many 
methods; known methods include the use of browser security exploits, posing as 
a ‘legitimate’ executable, such as a software lic
audio-video codec pack, and installation via another botnet that the machine is 
already a part of. Artro uses HTTP for C&C; requests and responses are base64-
encoded and RC4-encrypted. Typically, the bot is instructed to download and 
execute further malware- adware/clickfraud, and sometimes more bots. 
> Trojan: Carberp: Carberp adds itself to the current user’s startup directory, hides 
itself using rootkit techniques, attempts to disable a wide variety of anti-virus 
software, and steals password
C&C. 
> Spam Sender: An IP address reported as a Spam Sender has connected to a 
spamtrap and submitted m
Spam Intelligence Database (SID). A description of spamtraps is provided in the 
section on detection methods below. For this type of compromise, the number of 
messages submitted that were sent by the reported IP address over the 24-hour 
time span of the query to SID is supplied in the AISI report, for example, 
‘Messages reported: 102’. Redacted versions of the spam messages relating to 
these reports may be made available to ISPs on request. 
> Spam Sender—SendSafe: An IP address reported with this compromise type 
has been detected to have sent spam to spamtraps where the operators of the 
spamtrap have fingerprinted it with particular characteristics of mail sent by 
SendSafe, a bulk email software package. In such cases, the ACMA receive
reports from the source indicating this compromise type, rather than having the 
spam messages submitted to SID. 
> Fast Flux: Fast Flux entries are IP addresses which are pointed to by a rapidly 
changing domain (these reports are currently quite rare). These ‘fast fluxing’ 
domain names are typically used by bulletproof hosting services to make it 
difficult for e-security and anti-spam organisations to get all of the hosting serve
shut down. Fast Flux is typically used to host content like phishing sites and ch
pornography. Reports of Fast Flux in the AISI typically include a URL that
pointed to the
server will generally be found on the infected computer and require removal as 
per any other trojan compromise. 
There is a chance of a ‘false positive’ in Fast Flux, as the bulletproof hosting 
organisation may be pointing a domain name to an address that no longer 
belongs to the trojan infected machine. However, we are unaware of any 
instances of this occurring in the AISI data to date. 
> Trojan: Spyeye: Spyeye shares many similarities with Zeus and is able to steal 
web form inputs, email, credit card details, as well as passwords used over 
HTTP, POP and FTP. It uses HTTP for C&C and (like Zeus) does so via a URL 
whose filename component often is ‘gate.php’. 
> Trojan: Gbot: Gbot modifies the registry in multiple locations to ensure that it 
runs when the system boots. Known locations that it may use in
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HKML\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, 
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\Load, and 
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Shell. It 
e-
reported by sources which provide 
 
ally, they will 
n: 
t’s executable file may begin with ‘svd’, but 
 
rvers that are 
se are 
ed by infected computers. 
-
ted system. As of April 2012, typical infection 
n 
th 
galaxy.pl, on channel #virtu.  
re 
browser 
f that activity is not 
he 
configures itself as a HTTP proxy via HKCU\SoftwareMicrosoft\Windows 
NT\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ProxyServer. Gbot makes HTTP requests to 
pages that return a 404 status, but may still log system information sent to them. 
> Trojan: Oddbob: This worm spreads via Windows vulnerabilities in the LSASS 
and RPC subsystems. 
> Trojan: Ozdok: Ozdok is a spamming botnet which infects computers via ‘driv
by-download’ on websites. 
> DDOS Drone: A DDOS Drone is typically 
DDOS detection and mitigation services to their customers; the IP address 
reported has been detected as having participated in a DDOS attack. While some
DDOS attacks may be willingly participated in by customers, gener
have been initiated by a botnet, and the malware may be detected as per ‘Troja
Generic’ as described below. 
> Trojan: Dirtjumper: Dirtjumper is a DDOS bot that uses HTTP for C&C 
communications. It polls the C&C server for instructions and can be returned a list 
of URLs to attack, in plain-text. The bo
not necessarily. The file C:\WINDOWS\syskey2i.drv, which contains a numerical
per-bot ID, may be present. Up-to-date antivirus should detect Dirtjumper, though 
possibly under synonyms, or generic malware categories, like ‘Downloader’. 
> Trojan: DNSChanger: DNSChanger refers to a class of malware that modifies 
the settings of an infected computer so that it uses DNS se
associated with the malware publisher as its local nameservers. These DNS 
servers return IP addresses of webservers also associated with the publishers of 
the malware, so that they may potentially log web browsing, steal login 
credentials, return fraudulent content for a given URL or otherwise interfere with 
web content requested from an infected computer. Infection by currently known 
variants can be confirmed by examining the configured DNS servers in the 
TCP/IP properties or ‘ipconfig /all’ and comparing to the known-correct settings of 
the ISP and/or LAN. Some DNS servers that have been used for this purpo
being sinkholed in order to identify IP addresses us
> Trojan: Virut: Virut refers to a family of file infecting viruses that target and infect 
.EXE and .SCR files on the compromised system. The malware contains an IRC
based backdoor that provides unauthorised access, file download and remote 
execution capabilities on the infec
symptoms include an increase in file size of infected files with recent modificatio
date and possible execution failures, as well as network traffic on TCP 65520 wi
connections to IRC server proxima.irc
> Trojan: Kelihos: Kelihos is a spambot. It may install WinPcap, a kernel-mode 
driver for capturing network traffic. If so, the files packet.dll, wpcap.dll and 
drivers\npf.sys will be found in C:\Windows\System32, though if the computer 
legitimately had WinPcap installed, for example, for Wireshark, this would not 
indicate a compromise. Known variants add a value named ‘SmartIndex’ to 
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run in order to ensu
the bot starts when Windows does. 
> Suspicious URL: Suspicious URLs are URLs that have been identified as 
hosting or being involved in activity such as phishing, malware hosting, 
exploits, drive-by-download, and a more specific description o
available from the original source report. 
> Trojan: Flashback: Trojan Flashback affects OS X based computers. It uses a 
Java vulnerability to infect the system. No user interaction is required other than 
visiting a compromised website. The Trojan uses HTTP to communicate with t
C&C and includes the Apple unique hardware id in the communication to 
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differentiate itself from other bots. Apple released a fix for Java on 12 April 2012 
and a free Flashback removal tool through the Software Update Application in OS
X. The reported harmful consequences 
 
of Flashback include the harvesting of 
luding 
, 
ses and 
et 
 
ke 
h 
, 
nt compromise type identified in each instance. This is generally because 
 
 
istry 
log 
 
ch as the ACMA. Conficker is an example of 
le, a 
. Therefore, it can be inferred that mail that is 
h 
a 
personal information provided through web browsing activities, inc
usernames and passwords.  
> Trojan: Feodo: Feodo is a banking trojan similar in operational features to Zeus
SpyEye, Bugat or Carberp. Feodo hooks into web browser proces
monitors active sessions for accessed URLs matched against a list of targ
URLs from its configuration file. Captured form data is then transmitted to a C&C
server. The trojan is capable of injecting rogue forms in order to trick the victim 
into providing more information than requested by the original legitimate form. 
Feodo targets not only banks but also a number of additional online services li
Paypal, Amazon, MySpace or Gmail. 
Information on some methods used to detect activity reported in the AISI 
The ACMA obtains data on compromised IP addresses from a variety of sources. 
These sources, some of which are confidential, are continually updated and new 
sources added. The ACMA’s experience with the AISI is that over time, some 
detection methods become outdated and are superseded by new sources wit
alternative ways of detecting compromises. 
 
Occasionally multiple instances of the same IP address will be identified in the reports
with a differe
different sources have identified activity originating from this IP address. 
 
The ACMA is always interested in receiving information about potential new feeds of 
data for the AISI, and would welcome any suggestions of potential new sources. (New
feeds are rigorously tested before being integrated into the daily AISI reports.) 
 
The original sources of data fed into the AISI detect the activity reported using a 
variety of methods. Some of those methods are as follows: 
> Sinkholes: If a family of malware is known to send traffic to a particular domain
name (such as that of the C&C server), it may be possible for a security 
monitoring and reporting organisation to, with co-operation of the domain reg
and/or registrar, obtain control of the domain name. The organisation can then 
data relating to the traffic they receive that is destined for that domain name and
report this data to relevant parties su
malware that is tracked with the use of sinkholes. 
> Honeypots: A honeypot is a machine that appears to have security 
vulnerabilities, to encourage attackers to attempt to break into it. For examp
honeypot may send a server header as part of a HTTP response that indicates it 
is running IIS 4.0, when in fact it is the webserver component of a honeypot 
software suite. The details of the attempted attacks are logged and reported. 
> Spamtraps: A spamtrap is a mailbox, or more typically, entire domain or 
mailserver, to which legitimate mail is never sent, because the owner has never 
consented for mail to be sent there
sent there is spam. This spam sometimes contains anomalous properties (suc
as misspelt headers or mismatching identifiers) that indicate it was sent by 
certain malware family.  
Further information 
More information on the AISI is available on the ACMA website at: 
www.acma.gov.au/aisi. 
 
Once you have been receiving daily reports for a while, the ACMA may contact you to 
obtain information on issues relating to the reports, such as how customers are 
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respon y have to further 
enha
 
Please also r our IP 
addres
 
HU
ding to the advice you provide and any suggestions you ma
nce the initiative. 
emember to periodically provide the ACMA with updates to y
s ranges. 
For general enquiries about the AISI please contact the ACMA by email at 
aisi@acma.gov.au. Alternatively AISI staff can be contacted by telephone on the 
ACMA’s spam/e-security general enquiries number: 1300 855 180. 
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XXX.2XX.10.220   2012-08-08 2X:X8:55  Trojan: Ramnit        ISPXXX     None 
XXX.XX.178.2XX   2012-08-08 0X:5X:18  Trojan: Ramnit        ISPXXX     None 
XX2.XX.18X.171   2012-08-07 07:X0:0X  Trojan: Flashback     ISPXXX     None 
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Timestamp   
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are relativ
         T
XX2.XX.1XX.1     2012-08-08 21:28:18  Trojan: Zeus          ISPXXX     None 
XX0.0.72.81      2012-08-08 0X:01:X7  Trojan: Zeus          ISPXXX     None 
XX0.0.X1.X5      2012-08-08 21:05:XX  Trojan: Zeus          ISPXXX     None 
XXX.2XX.X.7X     2012-08-07 15:X7:25  Trojan: Conficker     ISPXXX     None 
XX2.XX.17X.1XX   2012-08-07 0X:1X:2X  Trojan: Conficker     ISPXXX     None 
XX0.0.X7.57      2012-08-07 05:XX:2X  Trojan: Conficker     ISPXXX     None 
XX0.0.71.10X     2012-08-07 01:01:00  Trojan: Conficker     ISPXXX     None 
XX0.0.X1.X5      2012-08-07 0X:5X:0X  Trojan: Conficker     ISPXXX     None 
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Attachment C: Example of AISI repeated sightings report 
Dear XXXXXXX, 
The following report lists compromises that have been reported 10 or more days over the last 14. 
The list is sorted by 'Type' (in descending order from the most significant compromise type) the ' p ' 
descending order. 
 
For help interpreting this report, please contact <aisi@aisi.acma.gov.au>
Days Re orted in 
 
 
Please note, all timestamps are relative to Coordinated Universal Time (GMT+0) 
 
--- Report follows --- 
 
        IPv6 address           Min Timestamp           Max Timestamp       Days Reported                    Type 
      XX0.21X.XX.1XX     2012-07-15 11:X1:2X     2012-07-27 15:51:25                  13          Trojan: Sality 
       XX0.21X.X2.X1     2012-07-16 1X:XX:5X     2012-07-28 1X:57:0X                  13          Trojan: Ramnit 
      XX0.21X.12X.X5     2012-07-15 1X:00:2X     2012-07-27 0X:5X:2X                  13       Trojan: Conficker 
      XX0.21X.XX.171     2012-07-15 17:X0:2X     2012-07-27 11:XX:00                  13       Trojan: Conficker 
      XX0.21X.1XX.11     2012-07-15 05:X1:00     2012-07-27 10:XX:25                  13       Trojan: Conficker 
      XX0.21X.10X.XX     2012-07-17 0X:XX:XX     2012-07-27 1X:X0:0X                  12          Trojan: Ramnit 
      XX0.21X.5X.11X     2012-07-15 11:5X:2X     2012-07-27 0X:X5:2X                  12       Trojan: Conficker 
       XX0.21X.0.255     2012-07-17 0X:2X:00     2012-07-27 11:X2:X7                  11         Trojan: Generic 
      XX0.21X.10X.X2     2012-07-16 1X:51:XX     2012-07-27 1X:XX:XX                  11          Trojan: Ramnit 
       XX0.21X.5X.XX     2012-07-18 17:1X:XX     2012-07-28 17:10:1X                  10          Trojan: Ramnit 
     XX0.21X.12X.15X     2012-07-16 1X:1X:11     2012-07-28 1X:X7:57                  10          Trojan: Ramnit 
      XX0.21X.1X.1XX     2012-07-17 01:0X:X2     2012-07-28 1X:17:X1                  10          Trojan: Ramnit 
      XX0.21X.X0.1XX     2012-07-16 21:X1:57     2012-07-28 05:55:0X                  10          Trojan: Ramnit 
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Attachment D: Research 
methodology and sampling 
Methodolog
Personal tel ne interviews  conducted with 24 randomly selected AISI 
participants ee cem 011 and 2 February 2012. These 24 were selected 
from a stratified list of the 90 AISI members who received compromised computer 
reports from the ACMA in late 2011.  
 
Although ran ly d, the sample size of 24 is too small to be statistically 
representati  all  partic ts. The results in this report provide an indication of 
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in Australia and the Australian Capital Territory (ACT), and include companies that 
provide nationa s. Table 1 also shows the number of providers interviewed 
ed with ISI participants.  
 Comp n of interviewed 
l service
 the A
ariso
compar
 
Table 1 sample with AISI participants 
Size of inter rovider net p
(categorised he number of  by t
compromise orted per day) s rep
AISI participants 
who received 
reports 
Interview sample 
 Number % Number % 
Small (up t es reported per da 42 o 20 cas y) 45 48 10 
Mediu
day) 
m (2 ses reported per 29 1–599 ca 24 26 7 
Large 
day) 
(600 ases reported per 17 –5,000 c 10 11 4 
Univer
per da
sity  <10 cases reporte
y) 
12 (usually d 14 15 3 
TOTAL 100 93 100 24 
Note: de
represen
indicatio
 
spite om of the o small to be statistically 
tativ ISI s who The results in this report provide an 
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Attachment E: Interview g
Personal telephone interviews—key issues and questions for the per
uide 
son who 
deals with the AISI reports 
cover the following issues (along with sufficient probing in a 
ISI 
Telephone interviews will 
way that is not leading, for example, do you use the reports in any other ways? Can 
you give me an example? Can you take me through that process?). 
 
1. Explore how each provider makes use of, and takes action on, the daily A
reports provided by the ACMA  
Examples of follow-up questions: 
> What information, advice and assistance is offered to customers (about 
compromised computers), if any?  
> Are processes automated?  
. Explore how each provider makes use of, and takes action on, the AISI 
or 
> How often do you take action?  
e IP addresses in the reports with 
t 
ake 
there 
h 
> What other data about compromised computers are used? How is that 
information used?  
> Why do you wait for multiple compromises to be reported in AISI reports 
before you take action?  
> Are there certain problems that you notify customers about, and others that 
you don’t? 
> Does your approach vary with the severity of the compromises reported? 
2
repeated sightings reports 
Then ask follow-up questions similar to question 1. 
3. Roughly estimate the proportion or percentage of daily reports and/
repeated sightings reports that are used to inform customers that their 
computer/s may be compromised 
Examples of follow-up questions: 
4. Identify reasons for not using all or part of the data contained in the AISI 
reports, and what the reasons for non-use are 
Examples of follow-up questions: 
> If participants say they cannot match th
their customers: Why is that?  
5. Identify any additional information that the ACMA could provide to make i
easier for participants to act on either the daily or weekly AISI reports?  
> PROBE for details. 
> Ask for additional information that the ACMA or others could provide to m
it easier for the provider/university to act on AISI reports. (For instance, 
may be information provided by some other party—but not provided throug
the AISI—that would make it easier to action AISI reports). 
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6. If customers are contacted about compromised computers, identify the 
types of feedback that providers receive from their customers.  
Examples of follow-up questions: 
> How much customer feedback is received? 
gative? 
problems fixed?
re informat s of further information 
> Do you have staff that are devoted stom ervice  of 
stomers  to a com ise on
nsive or resistant to advice from provider. 
7 ken on the AISI reports, wha r 
t and respond to malware-related threat  
For example, what monitoring activit o you u ke of your networ
any)? 
. Can you think of any improvements that could be made to the AISI program 
or to the compromised computer reports that it produces? 
> PROBE fully for ideas and details about possible improvements. 
9. The AISI program is considering the introduction of a self-serve portal that 
providers could use to access reports and other information. What do you 
think about that idea? 
> PROBE for details. 
10.  Before we finish, is there anything else that you would like to add about the 
AISI program with regard to you or your customers?  
> PROBE as necessary 
For the ACMA’s purpose only, record: 
> name of contact, company or university 
> whether small, medium or large company 
> market focus, that is, residential and/or business. 
 
> What is the nature of that feedback? Is it mostly positive or ne
> To what extent are 
> Do customers request mo
do they request? 
 
ion? What type/
 to the cu er s  aspects
handling AISI reports? 
> Also query to what extent cu
their computer are unrespo
 who are alerted prom  
. Separate from any action that is ta t othe
activities are undertaken to detec
your network? 
s to
> ies d nderta k (if 
> Do you report malicious activity detected in your network to internal security 
or fraud control, or to any external authorities? 
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